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Abstract 
 
The first chapter of this dissertation estimates the relative contributions of two major 
exchanges on crude oil futures to the price discovery process-- Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME) and Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), using trade-by-trade data in 2008. The study also 
empirically analyzes the effects of trading characteristics on the information share of these two 
markets. Trading characteristics examined in the study include trading volume, trade size, and 
trading costs. On average, CME is characterized by greater volume and trade size but also 
slightly greater bid-ask spread. CME leads the process of price discovery and this leadership is 
caused by relative trade size and volatility before the financial crisis of 2008; however post-crisis 
period this leadership is caused by trading volume. Moreover, this study presents evidence that, 
in times of large uncertainty in the market, the market maker charges a greater bid-ask spread for 
the more informative market. 
The second chapter examines the influence of expected oil price volatility, the behavior 
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the US Dollar exchange rate 
volatility on the backwardation of crude oil futures during the period from January 1986 to 
December 2008. The results indicate that oil futures are strongly and weakly backwardated 57% 
and 69% of the time, respectively.  The regression analysis of weak backwardation shows that oil 
volatility, OPEC overproduction (difference between quota and the actual production), and the 
volatility of the US Dollar against the Japanese Yen have a positive significant effect on oil 
backwardation, while OPEC production quota imposed on its members has a negative significant 
effect on oil backwardation. However the volatility of US Dollar against the British Pound has 
no significant effect on oil backwardation. The regression analysis of strong backwardation 
produces qualitatively the same results except that volatility has no effect.  In a sub-period 
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analysis, evidence also indicates that trading volume of oil funds and backwardation are 
negatively related, suggesting that oil funds increase the demand of futures relative to that of 
spot.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Oil futures, price discovery, trading characteristics, bid-ask spread, financial crisis, 
backwardation, OPEC, oil funds, and exchange rate. 
Introduction 
This dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay of my dissertation examines the 
contributions of Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s (CME) and Intercontinental Exchange (ICE)’s 
Futures Europe oil futures contracts to the price discovery process, using trade-by-trade data in 
2008. The study also analyzes the effects of trading characteristics on the information share of 
these two markets. Specifically, the study examines trading volume, trade size, and trading costs. 
Since bid and ask prices are either unavailable or nonbinding in futures market, the study 
estimates the daily effective bid-ask spread using Hasbrouck (2004) Gibbs estimator that is based 
on the Roll’s (1984) model and Bayesian estimation. Furthermore, the essay compare the periods 
before and after September 2008, when the collapse of housing finance produced a global 
liquidity crunch.  
 The first essay find that the information share of CME and trading characteristics that 
most affect information share vary substantially between pre and post crisis periods. During the 
pre-crisis period, relative trade size and volatility are positively related to CME’s information 
share. After the crisis, however, CME’s share drops to 87%. Moreover, trade size is no longer a 
significant explanatory variable for information share; rather, trading volume is. During liquidity 
crunch it is reasonable to expect that trading might contain a great degree of noise thus trade size 
carries no credible information. A broader market, as represented by greater volume, would be 
more informative. The essay also find evidence that during period of great uncertainty, market 
makers set greater spreads to more informed market, as a protection for greater likelihood of 
adverse selection problem (i.e., trading with more informed traders). 
1 
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The second essay of my dissertation examines the influence of expected oil price 
volatility, the behavior of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the 
US Dollar exchange rate volatility on oil futures backwardation during January 1986 –December 
2006.  Additionally, the impact of oil fund activity is examined; since oil funds are relatively 
new however, the analysis involving oil fund activity utilizes a much shorter sample period 
(April 2006- December 2008). Studying these factors can improve our understanding of the spot-
futures relation.   
The second essay shows that oil futures generally exhibit backwardation. In specific, it 
shows that oil futures are strongly and weakly backwardated 57% and 69% of the time, 
respectively, during the period from January 1986 to December 2008. The study builds on 
Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) theory that offer an explanation for the backwardation in oil 
futures based on the option pricing theory.  
Furthermore, the essay finds that OPEC production quota imposed on its members has a 
negative significant effect on weak and strong backwardation, while the OPEC member’s 
overproduction (difference between quota and the actual production) and the uncertainty of US 
Dollar exchange rate against the Japanese Yen have a positive significant effect on oil 
backwardation. The results also indicate a negative association between the United States Oil 
Fund (USO) volume and backwardation. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Analyzing the Role of Trading Cost and Trading Activity on Information Share: The Case 
of Crude Oil Futures Traded on CME and ICE 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Oil is without doubt among the most important commodities and oil futures is among the 
most liquid futures contracts in the world. During 2008–9, the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
light, sweet crude oil futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s (CME) Globex 
electronic trading platform and the Brent crude oil futures traded on Intercontinental Exchange 
(ICE)’s Futures Europe are ranked first and second, respectively, among the top 20 energy 
futures and options traded in the world.
1
  The competition between the two markets has also 
increased in recent years
2
. Therefore, it should be interesting to examine the interactions between 
these two markets.  
The main goal of this study is to estimate the contributions of CME and Brent-ICE oil 
futures contracts to the price discovery process by utilizing the common factor components 
(CFC) model of Gonzalo and Granger (1995), which is based on the vector error correction 
model. The study also analyzes the effects of trading characteristics on the information share of 
these two markets. Specifically, the study examines trading volume, trade size, and trading costs. 
Since bid and ask prices are either unavailable or nonbinding in futures market, the study 
                                                 
1
 The ranking was based on the number of contracts traded and/or cleared in terms of energy futures and options. 
The total numbers of traded light, sweet crude oil futures contracts on CME were around 135 million and 137 
million contracts in 2008 and 2009, respectively, whereas the total numbers of traded Brent Crude Oil Futures 
contracts on ICE were around 68 million and 74 million contracts in 2008 and 2009, respectively. 
2 For instance, on February 3, 2006, ICE started trading WTI crude oil (a U.S. energy commodity) futures on its 
electronic platform in London.  Since then, the ICE market share of WTI futures has increased.2  As a counter-
action, on September 5, 2006 the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) launched its electronically traded 
contracts on CME.   
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estimates the daily effective bid-ask spread using Hasbrouck (2004) Gibbs estimator that is based 
on the Roll’s (1984) model and Bayesian estimation. 
 The only other study that analyzes the price discovery between these two markets is a 
working paper by Figuerola and Gonzalo (2009).  In their study they explore the price discovery 
in New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) that 
was later acquired by ICE in 2001.  They used Figuerola and Gonzalo (2010)’s
3
 model to assess 
the contribution of each market to the price discovery process.  Empirical results indicate that 
NYMEX makes a larger contribution to price discovery than IPE.  They also argue that these 
results are likely determined by the relative liquidity in the two closely related markets.  
However, their study uses relative volume as a proxy for liquidity and liquidity arguably has 
many dimensions. Moreover, Johnson (2008) theoretically and empirically shows that volume is 
a noisy estimator of liquidity.  
Brunetti and Gilbert (2000) and Kaufmann and Ullman (2009) examine the relationship 
between crude oil futures markets; however, they focus on determining the lead/lag relationship 
and the causal relationships between crude oil futures markets to determine which market 
dominates the others.  In general, these studies indicate that NYMEX crude oil futures is the 
dominant market in crude oil futures and that it is the leader in the price discovery process.  
However, none examines the reasons for this dominance, although they argue that it might be 
due to the fact that NYMEX crude oil futures has longer history and higher trading volume than 
other markets.   
                                                 
3  Figuerola and Gonzalo (2010) use a general equilibrium model of the term structure of commodity markets that 
takes account of endogenous convenience yields to capture the existence of backwardation (contango) structures, 
leading to the Gonzalo-Granger Permanent Transitory decomposition. 
5 
 
Another important objective of this study is to study whether a market’s share of price 
discovery varies with the general level of liquidity. Accordingly, the sample period is chosen to 
be 2008.  The global financial crisis began to take hold in late 2008 and it is possible that the 
resulting liquidity crunch altered the effects of trading on the relative informativeness of markets. 
It should be noted that the volatility of oil market is high; for example, oil price ranged from $50 
to $147 during the 2007–2008 period. 
In sum, my contributions are to examine the relative contributions of crude oil futures 
contracts traded on CME and ICE in the price discovery process and to assess the effects of 
trading characteristics on the information share. The results of this study should provide 
implications for the role of trading characteristics on the relative leadership of markets. No less 
importantly, this study estimates bid-ask spread thus can examine the impact of trading costs on 
information share. This study will use the Gibbs estimator as described in Hasbrouck (2004) to 
estimate the effective bid ask spread in crude oil futures market. Moreover, this study analyzes 
whether the importance of trading cost and trading activity vary with market conditions, 
especially whether their effects change under liquidity crunch. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section two provides a more 
systematic review of the literature on the relationship among crude oil futures markets and also 
discusses the potential role of trading costs and trading activity on market share of information 
discovery. Section three describes the data.  Section four presents the estimation of market’s 
contribution to price discovery.  Section five presents the regression methodology to assess the 
role of trading cost and trading activity on relative price leadership between the two markets, and 
section six gives the results.  Section seven presents robustness check for the regression analysis. 
Section eight offers concluding remarks. 
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2. Literature Review 
This section reviews the related studies and is divided into two subsections. Subsection 
2.1 reviews the prior studies that examine the relation among crude oil futures markets.  This is 
followed by subsection 2.2, which discusses the potential role of trading costs and trading 
activity on market share of information discovery.  
 
2.1. Relationships among the Crude Oil Futures Markets  
Previous studies investigate the causal relationship and the price discovery process 
between futures and spot prices for crude oil.  Silvapulle and Moosa (1999) investigate the casual 
relationship between the spot and futures prices for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet 
crude oil in the U.S.  Using linear causality testing, they find that futures prices lead spot prices.  
On the other hand, when using a nonlinear causality test, they show that there is a bidirectional 
interaction of the futures and spot prices.  They argue that these results suggest a simultaneous 
reaction to new information. 
Kaufmann and Ullman (2009) also examine the causal relationships among crude oil 
prices from markets in North America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East on both the spot 
market and futures markets.  They argue that the existence of causal relationships is consistent 
with the implication of imperfect markets, in which changes may first appear in the price of one 
or more markets, as new information about the supply/demand balance becomes available, and 
these changes may subsequently spread to all markets.  They analyze 90 bivariate casual 
relationships for 10 spot and futures markets.
4
  Of the 90 estimated error correction models, they 
find 21 statistically significant relationships.  The map of these 21 relationships shows two 
                                                 
4
 These markets include: WTI far month futures of U.S., WTI near month futures of U.S., WTI spot of U.S., Brent 
far month futures of London, Brent near month futures of London, Brent spot of London, Dubai near month 
futures of United Arab Emirates (UAE), Dubai spot of UAE, Bonny spot of Nigeria, and Maya spot of Mexico. 
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gateways for innovations, by which they mean a crude oil market that ―Granger causes‖ the price 
of other crude oil markets but is not ―Granger caused‖ by the price of other crude oil market.  
One innovation gateway is originated in Dubai spot prices and the other innovation gateway is 
originated from the WTI-far month futures contract traded in NYMEX.   
Brunetti and Gilbert (2000) model the volatility of the two closely related markets, 
NYMEX and IPE (now ICE) crude oil futures markets.  Their results imply that IPE volatility 
reacts to shocks to NYMEX volatility much more strongly than NYMEX does to the IPE; thus, 
the dominant volatility linkage is from NYMEX to the IPE.  Moosa (2002) confirms the 
leadership of the petroleum futures market in the price discovery process.  He uses the daily spot 
and futures prices of WTI crude oil between January 2, 1985 and July 11, 1996 in a system of 
two seemingly unrelated time series equations and allows the coefficients to be time-varying; his 
empirical results indicate that 60% of the price discovery function is performed in the futures 
markets.  Also, an earlier study by Schwarz and Szakmary (1994) finds evidence that the futures 
prices for crude oil traded on the NYMEX leads the crude oil spot prices.  Specifically, they find 
that crude oil futures lead the price discovery process for the sample period of January 1, 1984, 
to May 15, 1991.  Schwarz and Szakmary (1994) findings suggest that the futures market in 
crude oil is the dominant market for price leadership.  Moreover, they argue that these findings 
are consistent with the tremendous growth and success of the energy futures contracts traded at 
the NYMEX.   
Rappaport (2000) argues that energy futures facilitate price discovery, in which exchange 
provides a centralized, open, liquid forum for buyers and sellers to conduct business, and by 
which the prices of all transactions conducted therein are publicly disseminated.  Moreover 
energy futures contracts improve liquidity and price transparency since they permit hedging, by 
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giving market participants the ability to shift their exposure to other participants who are more 
willing to bear that risk.  Rappaport (2000) also points out the increasingly important role of the 
NYMEX energy futures contracts and argues that it becomes the world’s most actively traded 
contract for a physical commodity and a worldwide pricing benchmark.   
 
2.2. Role of Trading Cost and Trading Activity on Information Share 
Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley (1996) argue that in perfectly frictionless and rational 
markets, new information should be reflected in the prices of all markets simultaneously.  
However, the magnitude of trading costs differ among these markets, and thus price discovery 
will tend to occur in the lowest-cost market, as it generates the highest net profit.  Their trading 
cost hypothesis suggests that markets with the lowest trading cost will provide the leadership in 
price discovery; this hypothesis differs from the leverage hypothesis that states that price 
discovery occurs in derivative markets because futures and options require smaller capital 
outlays.  Fleming et al. (1996) assess the magnitude of trading costs in the stock, stock option, 
index option, and index futures markets by analyzing the bid ask spread and trading volume data 
during March 1991.  According to their trading cost hypothesis, markets with the lowest trading 
costs should lead the price discovery.  Empirically, they find S&P 100 index options lead the 
underlying S&P 100 index and S&P 500 index futures leads the S&P 500 stock index.  Since 
trading S&P 500 futures costs around 3% of the cost of trading an equivalent stock portfolio, the 
results are largely consistent with the trading cost hypothesis.  They also find that S&P 500 
futures prices lead slightly the prices of both S&P 100 index put and call options.  This result is 
consistent with the fact that the direct trading costs in the S&P 100 option market are higher than 
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those in the S&P 500 futures market.  Overall, the results provide support for the trading cost 
hypothesis.   
Other studies, most of which look at equity-related markets, find empirical evidence that 
supports the trading cost hypothesis.  For example, Eun and Sabherwal (2003) examine price 
discovery for a sample of Canadian stocks listed on both Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and 
U.S. exchange.  They find a negative relationship between the TSE share of price discovery and 
the ratio of quoted spreads on the U.S. exchange and the TSE.  A lower ratio of spreads implies a 
greater competitive threat faced by the TSE market makers from the U.S. market makers; hence 
their findings support the trading cost hypothesis.  Other studies that examine stock index futures 
and their respective cash market (see Kim, Szakmary, and Schwarz, 1999) and that oversee stock 
index futures and index options (e.g., Hsieh, Lee, & Yuan, 2008; De Jong & Donders, 1998) also 
find support for the trading cost hypothesis. 
Easley and O'Hara (1987) market structure research has given greater attention to the 
effect of asymmetric information on market prices. They propose a generalized model in which 
the market maker does not know whether any of the traders are informed or whether all of them 
are uninformed. They show that trade size introduce an adverse selection problem into security 
trading. It is because informed traders prefer to trade large amounts at any given price provided 
that they wish to trade. As a result, the larger the trade size, the more likely that the market 
makers trade with informed traders. The optimal pricing strategies for the market makers is then 
to quote bid and ask prices depending on trade size, specifically quoting larger spread for  larger 
trades. Therefore, trade size affects security prices by changing traders’ perception of the true 
value of the underlying asset. 
10 
 
Some studies suggest a link between volatility and price discovery.  For example, 
Martens (1998) studies the German bund futures traded at LIFFE (floor trading system) and the 
Deutsch Terminborse (DTB) (electronic trading system).  He finds that in periods of high 
volatility the German bund futures traded on LIFFE make a larger contribution to price discovery 
than the electronically traded German bund futures contracts traded on the DTB; however, in 
periods of low volatility the DTB German bund futures is more efficient although it has smaller 
volume share.  Martens (1998) argues that his results are consistent with the fact that open outcry 
has an advantage over electronic trading systems in volatile periods because floor traders can 
observe the actions of other traders; which, in turn, helps the floor traders to react faster.   
A recent study by Schlusche (2009) also confirms Martens (1998) findings, using the 
German blue chip index DAX: Exchange traded funds (ETFs) and index futures. He uses the 
VECM model and the common factor component weights of Gonzalo and Granger (1995), to 
assess the price leadership. Schlusche (2009) finds evidence that futures markets lead the process 
of price discovery, and that this leadership is caused by volatility and not liquidity (measured as 
relative liquidity).  He also shows that, from low to high volatility periods, the share of price 
leadership of the DAX index futures contracts decreases, whereas trading volume increases 
relative to the DAX-ETF market.  He argues that, in periods of high volatility, trading volume, 
number of contracts traded, and the relative volume in the DAX index futures contracts increase, 
causing a shift in informational efficiency in favor of the ETF. Thus, his findings support 
Martens (1998)’s results that volatility is a factor in the price discovery process.  Franke and 
Hess (2000) also provide empirical evidence that support volatility is a factor in the price 
discovery process while studying the Bund futures traded on LIFFE and DTB from 1991 to 
1995. 
11 
 
On the other hand, Ates and Wang (2005) fail to find support for volatility as a 
determinant of price discovery.  In their study, they examine the price discovery between regular 
index futures (floor trading system) and E-mini index futures (electronic trading system) in the 
S&P 500 and NASDAQ 100 index futures using both the information shares of Hasbrouck 
(1995) and the common factor weights of Gonzalo and Granger (1995)’s techniques.  They find 
that since 1998, the contribution made by E-mini index futures has been greater than the regular 
index futures.  Furthermore, they investigate the determinants of the rate of price discovery 
process using regression analysis and find evidence that relative liquidity (measured by market 
shares and the ratio of bid-ask spreads) and operational efficiency (measured by market activity) 
jointly determine the rate of price discovery process.  On the other hand, they find that volatility 
(measured by daily high-low volatility estimate and daily realized volatility) is statistically 
insignificant.   
Other studies also suggest trading systems matter in terms of price discovery.  Hasbrouck 
(2003) and Ates and Wang (2005), among others, examine price discovery under alternative 
trading systems in the U.S. exchanges.  They find that the electronic trading system leads the 
price discovery process compared with other trading systems, namely open-outcry.  They argue 
these results are consistent with the advantages offered by the electronic trading system; 
specifically, it offers faster speed and accuracy of processing transactions, lower trading cost, 
and more liquidity.  In addition, Tse, Bandyopadhyay, and Shen (2006) argue that electronic 
trading offers an advantage of anonymous trading.     
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3. Data  
This study uses intraday data to analyze the effects of trading characteristics on the 
information share of price discovery between the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet 
crude oil futures (electronic) traded on CME (WTI-CME hereafter) and the Brent crude oil 
futures (electronic) traded on ICE Futures of London (Brent-ICE hereafter).  The study covers 
the year 2008, from January 2 to December 31.  The year 2008 was a very volatile year, which is 
suitable for this study since it investigates information flow between the U.S. and UK markets 
and greater volatility might reflect greater information flow.  The data are purchased from Tick 
Data Inc.   
The continuous series of futures prices is generated by using the midpoint of the bid and 
ask quotes at five-minute intervals, which results in 75,952 observations spanning from January 
2008 to December 2008. To assess market contribution however, the methodology requires both 
markets to be open at the same time, hence the total number of 5-minute observations (intervals) 
declines to 47,568 for the 257 trading days in my sample. That is, the analysis excludes 28,168 
(37%) observations when the two markets are not simultaneously open. Table 1 shows the 
trading times as well as contract specifications for the two markets.  The CME trades the light 
sweet crude oil futures contracts in units of 1,000 barrels, with a minimum price fluctuation of 
$0.01 per barrel, with a physical settlement.  The electronic trading is conducted on the CME 
Globex trading platform and runs from 5:00 p.m. to 4:15 p.m. CST, Sunday through Friday, with 
a 45-minute break each day beginning at 4:15 p.m.  The ICE Futures trades Brent crude oil 
futures contracts of 1,000 barrels with a minimum price fluctuation of $0.01 per barrel with cash 
settlement.  In April 2005, ICE transferred Brent crude oil futures floor trading to an electronic 
13 
 
trading system.  The electronic trading starts at 7:00 p.m. CST and closes at 5:00 p.m. CST the 
following day. 
Table 1: Oil Futures Contract Specification 
The table reports the contract specification of the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet 
crude oil futures of U.S. and Brent crude oil futures of UK. 
 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
light, sweet crude oil futures 
 
Brent Crude Futures 
    
Trading hours Sunday - Friday 6:00 p.m. - 5:15 
p.m.(Eastern time) with a 45-minute 
break each day beginning at 5:15 
p.m. (Eastern time) 
 Open 01:00 London local time 
(23.00 on Sundays) Close 23:00 
London local time. 
    
Contract unit 1,000 barrels  1,000 barrels  
    
Price quotation U.S. Dollars and Cents per barrel  U.S. dollars and cents per barrel 
    
Trading 
Period/Strip 
 
Crude oil futures are listed nine years 
forward using the following listing 
schedule: consecutive months are 
listed for the current year and the 
next five years; in addition, the June 
and December contract months are 
listed beyond the sixth year. 
Additional months will be added on 
an annual basis after the December 
contract expires, so that an additional 
June and December contract would 
be added nine years forward, and the 
consecutive months in the sixth 
calendar year will be filled in. 
 A maximum of 72 consecutive 
months will be listed. In 
addition, 6 contract months 
comprising of June and 
December contracts will be 
listed for an additional three 
calendar years. Twelve 
additional contract months will 
be added each year on the 
expiry of the prompt December 
contract month.  
    
Settlement Type Physical  The ICE Brent Crude futures 
contract is a deliverable contract 
based on EFP delivery with an 
option to cash settle, i.e the ICE 
Brent Index price for the day 
following the last trading day of 
the futures contract. 
    
Venue  CME Globex, CME ClearPort 
 
 ICE Clear Europe 
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Table 2 provides summary statistics of the logarithm futures price for the two markets.  
The price series in both markets show positive kurtosis, indicating a leptokurtic, or fat tail.  Also, 
the price series in both markets have non-normal distribution, according to the Jarque-Bera (J-B) 
test.  The large ² values of J-B test statistics for return series are most likely due to the large 
values of the kurtosis coefficients estimated. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Prices 
The table summarizes the 5-min logarithm futures prices of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
light, sweet crude oil futures traded on CME (WTI-CME) and the Brent crude oil futures traded 
on ICE Futures of London (Brent-ICE). The notation ―a‖ refers to significance at 1% level. 
 
 WTI-CME  Brent-ICE  
    
Mean 4.548  4.536 
Variance 0.116  0.117 
Skewness -1.125a  -1.031a 
Kurtosis 0.323a  0.081a 
Jarque-Bera 10275.687a  8484.861a 
    
 
4. Estimating the Contribution to Discovery by Markets and the Estimated Information Share 
Hasbrouck (1995)’s
5
 information shares and Gonzalo and Granger (1995)’s
6
 common 
factor component model are the two methods most commonly utilized to assess the contribution 
of one market to the price discovery to the other market based on the vector error correction 
model (VECM).  However, Baillie, Booth, Tse, and Zabotina (2002) and De Jong (2002) both 
                                                 
5   See Shastri, Thirumalai and Zutter (2008) and Fung and Tse (2008), among others. 
6
 See Eun and Sabherwal (2003), Harris, McInish, and Wood (2002), and Harris, McInish, Shoesmith, and Wood 
(1995), among others. 
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show that the two models are closely related and complement each other.  In fact, both models 
provide different views of the price discovery process between markets.  More specifically, 
Gonzalo and Granger’s model focuses on the components of the common factor and the error 
correction process; whereas Hasbrouck’s model takes into account the variability of the 
innovations in each market’s price.  In addition, Harris, McInish, and Wood (2002) argue that the 
common factor components recover the true information share in a wide range of financial 
market microstructure models.
7  
This study employs the common factor components of Gonzalo and Granger (1995), 
which decomposes the common factor into a linear combination of the prices; the coefficients of 
the model indicate the amount of contribution of each market to the price discovery process.   
To justify the use of VECM, the two futures price series should be tested for unit root to 
establish that price series are integrated of order one.  I use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test to check for the presence of a unit root in each price series.  ADF unit root tests are 
conducted by estimating the following three regression equations for each price series (Pt) as 
follows: 
t
Q
i
itttt ePPP  


1
1  ,                         (1) 
t
Q
i
itttt ePPcP  


1
10  ,                 (2) 
t
Q
i
itttt ePPtccP  


1
110  ,    (3) 
where Q is the number of the lags in the model, which is determined by the Schwarz Bayesian 
criterion (Schwarz, 1978).  The three regression equations are similar to each other; the only 
                                                 
7
 The market microstructure literature examines the relationship between trading and information flow and how the 
structures of markets might affect that relationship. 
16 
 
difference is that equation (2) incorporates the presence of a drift, while equation (3) 
incorporates the presence of linear time trend.  The null hypothesis for ADF unit root test is that 
=0 in all three cases.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, then Pt contains a unit root. 
Table 3 reports the results for ADF with intercept only, and with both intercept and trend 
included.  As expected, futures prices series are non-stationary at level specification, but their 
first log differences are stationary.  These results indicate the price series are integrated of order 
one I (1).   
 
Table 3: Stationary Tests 
 The table reports the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
light, sweet crude oil futures prices traded on CME (WTI-CME) and the Brent crude oil futures 
prices traded on ICE Futures of London (Brent-ICE). 
 
  No difference  First Difference 
  Intercept Intercept and trend  Intercept Intercept and trend 
       
WTI-CME  0.905 -0.638  -222.021 -222.048 
  0.993 0.976  0.000  0.000 
Brent-ICE  1.093 -0.536  -223.095 -223.126 
  0.995  0.982  0.000  0.000 
*MacKinnon approximate p-value 
 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) show that a common long memory component could be 
identified from a system of cointegrated variables, thus it is also important to establish evidence 
of a long run equilibrium relation between WTI-CME and Brent-ICE. I examine the 
cointegration relationship using the Johansen (1988) approach to determine the number of 
cointegrating vectors between PCME,t and PICE,t.  Table 4 shows that there is one cointegrating 
vector between WTI-CME and Brent-ICE.   
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Table 4: Johansen Cointegration Test 
The table reports the Johansen cointegration test for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet 
crude oil futures prices traded on CME (WTI-CME) and the Brent crude oil futures prices traded 
on ICE Futures London (Brent-ICE). The notation ―a‖ refers to significance at 1% level. 
 
     
  Eigen value Trace Maximum Eigen 
     
WTI-CME 
Brent -ICE 
None 0.008 371.058a 369.264a 
At most 1 3.77E-05 1.794 369.264 
     
 
If there are cointegration relations among both markets’ futures prices, the Granger 
representation theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987) implies that there exists a specification of the 
vector error correction model (VECM) as follows:  
 
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,   (4) 
where CMEtP  and 
ICE
tP  are the first log difference of futures prices for WTI-CME and Brent-
ICE, respectively.  PCME and PICE are the log prices of WTI-CME and Brent-ICE respectively.  
CME is the cointegration vector between the two markets such that CMEt
CMEICE
t
ICE PP 11    is 
cointegrated of order one, denoted by I(1).  Q is the number of the lags in the model based on the 
multivariate Schwarz Bayesian criterion (Schwarz, 1978). The coefficients ICE0  and 
CME
0 are 
constants. The coefficients of the error correction terms ICE1  and 
CME
1 (adjustment coefficients) 
indicate the responsiveness of the price series to any deviation from the equilibrium relationship 
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(i.e., the deviation of price difference between the two markets from zero).  CME and ICE are the 
unautocorrelated residuals.   
Following Gonzalo and Granger (1995)’s common factor component model, the relative 
contribution of one market to the price discovery process, or information share or the share of 
price discovery, is denoted as The WTI-CME share of price discovery CME can be calculated 
as follows:  
CMEICE
ICE
CME
11
1




 ,                                   (5) 
where CMEICE 11    represents the total adjustment to restore the equilibrium relation of prices.  
A higher value of CME reflects a larger contribution from WTI-CME to the price discovery.  
Similarly, the higher the value of (1-CME), the larger the contribution of Brent-ICE crude oil 
futures. 
With the futures price series of the WTI-CME and Brent-ICE being integrated of order 
one I(1) and cointegrated, model (4) is estimated with one lag as suggested by the Schwarz 
Bayesian criterion.  Table 5 shows the results of the estimation.  The coefficients of the error 
correction term (α) show that the WTI-CME generates more price discovery than Brent-ICE as 
indicated by the positive sign of the error correction term ( CME1  = 0.001). On the other hand, 
Brent-ICE market responds to the WTI-CME market, as indicated by the negative sign of the 
error correction term ( ICE1  = -0.009).  Table 5 also shows a strong impact of WTI-CME on the 
Brent-ICE contract, and there is little feedback from the Brent-ICE market to the WTI-CME 
market since the coefficient of the ICEtP 1 is not significant.   
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Table 5: Estimating Market Interactions Using Error Correction Model 
The table presents the results for the estimation of the vector error correction model as described 
in equation (4).  Share of price discovery () is the relative contribution of one market to the 
price discovery process using the common factor component of Gonzalo and Granger (1995). 
The t-values are given in parentheses. The notations ―a‖, ―b‖ and ―c‖ refer to significance at 1, 5 
and 10% level, respectively. 
  
Full sample 
Before financial crisis 
(Jan - Aug 2008) 
After financial crisis  
(Sep - Dec 2008) 
  WTI-
CME 
Brent-
ICE 
WTI-
CME 
Brent-
ICE 
WTI-
CME 
Brent-
ICE 
        
Constant (0)  -2.0E-05c -3.1E-06 6.2E-06 1.9E-07 -7.0E-05b -1.1E-05 
  (-1.72) (-0.27) (0.67) (0.02) (-2.44) (-0.37) 
Error Correction 
Term (1) 
 
0.001a -0.009a 0.000+ -0.010a 0.002c -0.010a 
  (2.84) (-18.68) (0.54) (-17.92) (1.75) (-11.78) 
Pt
ICE (1)  -0.000+ -0.019a -0.001 -0.016a -0.000+ -0.021a 
  (-0.04) (-4.19) (-0.09) (-2.77) (-0.04) (-2.65) 
Pt
CME (1)  -0.014a -0.016a -0.012b -0.016a -0.015c -0.018b 
  (-2.92) (-3.47) (-2.03) (-2.89) (-1.86) (-2.32) 
        
R2 (%)  
0.04 0.80 0.02 1.07 0.07 0.93 
Chi2  20.4a 375.2a 5.1 330.6a 11.8b 153.9a 
Log likelihood  428496.8 305828.3 137740.6 
        
Share of price 
discovery () 
 
86.57% 13.43% 96.97% 3.03% 86.92% 13.08% 
        
 
I further test the contribution to the price discovery from the two markets during the low 
and high volatility periods; thus, I split the sample into two subperiods.  The first period 
represents the months before the financial crisis (January–August 2008) and the second period 
represents the months after the financial crisis (September–December 2008).   
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Based on the VECM results, I estimate the share of price discovery for the two markets 
using equation (5).  It can be seen in table 5 that during 2008 the contribution of the WTI-CME 
market averages 87%, while the Brent-ICE contribution to the price discovery process averages 
only 13%. The contribution of the WTI-CME market is around 97% in the months before the 
financial crisis, and then it drops to around 87% in the months following the financial crisis.  
This drop in CME’s contribution might be explained by the fact that the 2008 financial crisis was 
global, thus the degree of market interaction increases after the crash.  In sum, it is clear that the 
WTI-CME market leads the price discovery process but the variations in contribution over time 
can be substantial.   
 
5. Method to Analyze the Role of Trading Cost and Trading Activity on Information 
Share 
 One of the main purposes of the paper is to examine the role of trading cost and trading 
activity on the information share of the two markets. To this end, the study performs a time 
series regression of the daily WTI-CME price discovery share
8
 (θt
CME
) on the relative volume, 
relative trading cost, relative trade size, and aggregate volatility. More specifically, the 
regression model is estimated as follows:  
 
tt
CME
t
CME
t
CME
t
CME
t VolatilityTradeSizeTradeCostVolume   43210 , (6) 
 
where Volumet
CME is the relative volume, computed as the daily volume of the WTI-CME to the 
total volume of WTI-CME and Brent-ICE futures on day t (volumet
CME
/ volumet
CME
 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that I use a substantial number of 5-minute observations to estimate the price discovery share 
(θ) for each day.  
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+volumet
ICE).  TradeCostt
CME is the relative estimate of the effective bid ask spread of WTI-CME 
to Brent-ICE using the Gibbs estimator described in Hasbrouck (2004) 
(TradeCostt
CME
/TradeCostt
ICE).    TadeSizet
CME is the relative trade size defined as the average 
trade size of WTI-CME to the average trade size of Brent-ICE futures on day t.  Volatilityt is the 
sum of the two markets’ volatility (volt
CME
+volt
ICE) on day t. 
Liquidity is not easily measured by one number alone. Most of the extant studies use the 
relative volume as a proxy for liquidity, and therefore volume is also included in this study.  
Hasbrouck (1995) finds a positive correlation between New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
information share and its trading volume.  Moreover, Theissen (2002) finds positive correlation 
between the common factor weights of the electronic stock market of Germany and its trading 
volume.  Hence, it is expected that the coefficient of the relative trading volume (Volumet
CME) to 
be positive. 
Although trading volume is one of the most commonly used measures for market 
liquidity, trading volume may not adequately captures liquidity as some studies such as Johnson 
(2008) suggest that volume is a noisy indicator of liquidity.  Consequently, trade size and trading 
cost are also analyzed here. Easley and O’Hara (1987 JFE) find evidence that larger trades are 
more likely to come from informed traders. Hence, it is expected that the exchange with larger 
average trade size would be more informative. As pointed out earlier, some studies suggest that 
the market with lower trading cost likely attracts more traders thus more informative trading. 
Trading costs include commissions and bid-ask spread (the difference between purchase and 
selling prices at a given point in time). Commissions vary slightly among brokers though they 
are small in general. On the other hand, literature generally views bid-ask spread as a 
compensation for market making and can reflect the degree of information asymmetry. In the 
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sense, it is an important dimension of liquidity. However, bid-ask data is unavailable and bid-ask 
quotes are often non-binding on floor trading. Therefore, bid-ask spread needs to be estimated. 
This study uses Hasbrouck (2004) Gibbs estimator; Hasbrouck claims that it is fairly efficient 
and reliable estimate of spread. A brief comparison of alternative spread estimates is given 
below. 
 The earlier estimator for the bid-ask spread in the futures market was proposed by Roll 
(1984).  He argues that, if markets are informationally efficient, then the covariance between 
futures price changes is directly related to the bid-ask spread.  Roll’s measure (RM) can be 
written as,  
 
),cov(2 1 tt ppRM .                                                                                  (7) 
 
However, when the covariance between adjacent price changes is positive, Roll’s 
measure cannot be used. 
 Another method used to estimate the bid-ask spread in the futures market is the 
Thompson and Waller (1988) estimator.  They argue that the average absolute price changes are 
a direct measure of the average execution cost of trading in a contract.  Their estimator (TW) can 
be written as   
 
  
T
t t
p
T
TW
1
1
,                                                                                   (8) 
where p
t
 is the series of nonzero price changes.  This estimator was applied by, for example, 
Thompson and Waller (1988), Tse and Zabotina (2004), and Tse and Bandyopadhyay (2006), to 
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study the liquidity costs in some futures contracts.  However, Thompson-Waller estimate gives 
an upward bias of the spread because it fails to recognize the variance of true price changes 
contained in the absolute value of price changes. 
 Hasbrouck Gibbs estimator (Hasbrouck, 2004) is based on the Roll’s model and Bayesian 
estimation using the Gibbs estimator (Markov Monte Carlo estimator) to infer the effective bid-
ask spread from the times series of transaction prices.  This estimator was applied by many 
studies such as Rangel (2005), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lunblad (2007), Brick, Palmon, and Patro 
(2007), and McLean (2010). 
 In Roll’s model, markets are assumed to be efficient; thus, let M
t
 represent the efficient 
price that follows a random walk.  The efficient price in the absence of transaction costs reflects 
all available public information.  In the futures market, dealers post bid (b
t
) and ask (a
t
) prices.  
Buyers buy at the ask price at and sellers receive the bid price bt 
cma
cmb
tt
tt


,                                                                                                         (9) 
 
in which m
t
 is the log efficient price and c is the transaction cost.  As a result the prices p
t
 that 
everyone observes when trading takes place are modeled as  
 
ttt
tttt
cqmp
Nuumm

  ),0(~
2
1  ,                                                                       (10) 
in which qt represents the direction of the incoming order and is given by the Bernoulli random 
variable qt{-1, +1}, where -1 indicates an order to sell, and +1 represents an offer to buy.  Thus 
depending on qt, the (log) transaction cost price is either at the bid or the ask.  
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qifb
p                                                                                     (11) 
 
Thus, the spread model (10) implies  
 
ttttttt uqccqmcqmp   )( 11 .                                 (12) 
 
Conventionally, equation (12) is estimated using the moment estimates.  Solving for var 
(pt) and cov(pt,pt-1) yields the following estimators:  
 
 22 2)var( cp ut   .                                                                                         (13) 
2
1),cov( cpp tt   .                                                                                     (14) 
 
In the Bayesian approach, the parameters are viewed as random variables.  The Gibbs 
estimator facilitates the Bayesian approach by using an algorithm to generate a sequence of 
samples from the conditional probability distributions of random variables.  This algorithm is 
motivated because it is applicable when the joint distribution is not known but the conditional 
distribution of each variable is known.  As a Markov chain Monte Carlo method, the Gibbs 
sampler generates sample values from the distribution of each variable in turn, conditional on the 
current values of the other variables.  In equation (12), the unknown parameters are the 
transaction cost c, 2u , and the joint distribution F(q,c,
2
u|p). 
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The Gibbs sampler is used to obtain sample values (q(i),c(i),2u
(i)
|p)  F(q,c,2u|p) based 
on the conditional distribution of p
t
.  This method is implemented using n random draws, which 
converge in distribution to the joint distribution after a sufficiently large number of iterations.  
The liquidity cost is then computed as the first moment of the marginal distribution f(c|p).  The 
implementation of the algorithm starts with the initial values (c(0),2u
(0)
, q
(0)
) then the next draws 
are:  
1. Draw c(1) from f(c|u
(0)
, q
(0)
, p) 
2. Draw u
(1) from f(u |c
(1)
, q
(0)
, p) 
3. Draw q(1) from   f(q| c(1), u
(1)
, p) 
 Figure 1 shows the estimated daily average trading cost of the WTI-CME futures and the 
Brent-ICE futures for the year 2008.  As seen in the figure, the trading cost in both markets move 
closely together.  However, the trading cost after September 7
9
 for both markets increased 
substantially and the variation in trading costs is large; also the pikes are consistent with main 
events during the crisis; for example the highest bid-ask for the U.S. contract was on December 
17 when the U.S. Federal Reserve reduced its interest rate to 0.25%. 
 According to the trading cost hypothesis, informed traders react more quickly to new 
information in markets with the lowest trading cost; thus, it is expected that the coefficient of the 
relative trading cost (TradeCostt
CME ) is inversely related to the WTI-CME price discovery share.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: WTI and Brent Oil Futures Trading Cost 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet crude oil futures of U.S. and Brent crude oil futures 
of UK trading cost measured using Hasbrouck (2004). 
                                                 
9
  On September 7, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are agencies that provide liquidity to the mortgage 
market, were rescued by the government. 
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The daily volatility is measured as the sums the squares of intraday returns (Andersen et 
al., 2001a, b).  Figure 2 shows the daily volatility for the WTI-CME and Brent-ICE in the year 
2008.  As seen in the figure, the volatility in both markets moved closely together; after 
September 7, volatility for both markets increased substantially and the variation in the volatility 
is large. Also the volatility pikes are again consistent with major events for the financial crises in 
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(a) WTI-CME trading cost
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(b) Brent-ICE trading cost
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2008; for example the highest value for the volatility for the U.S. contract was on December 16 
when Maddoff hedge fund fraud implied major losses at banks around the world. 
 
Figure 2: WTI and Brent Oil Futures Volatility 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet crude oil futures of U.S. and Brent crude oil futures 
of UK daily volatility measured as the sums the squares of intraday returns (Andersen et al.  
(2001a, b). 
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(a) WTI-CME daily volatility
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(b) Brent- ICE daily volatility
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Table 6 provides summary statistics for the daily average for the main independent 
variables in equation (6): volume, trading cost, trading size, and volatility for both markets in the 
year 2008, and separate statistics before and after the 2008 financial crisis. As the table shows, 
the average volume and trade size are higher in WTI-CME compared to those in Brent-ICE.
10
 
However, the trading cost measured by bid-ask spread is on average 4% greater in WTI-CME 
than in Brent-ICE. If larger trades convey more information as Easley and O’Hara theorize and 
empirically verify, it can explain the relatively greater trading cost in WTI-CME. Alternatively, 
several studies (e.g., Skouratova et al., 2008) show that electronic trading tends to be associated 
with lower trading costs than floor trading, so the higher cost in WTI-CME might simply reflect 
its greater reliance on floor trading. Nevertheless, bid-ask spread is small on average ($0.035 per 
barrel), so its role in information discovery might be of secondary importance compared to other 
trading characteristics. Volatility also averages 4% greater, which might be due to either a 
greater presence of informed trading or trading not motivated by information (commonly 
referred to as liquidity trading or noise trading). If trade size can be used as a proxy for informed 
trading, given that WTI-CME’s volume is about 100% larger whereas trade size is only about 
25% larger, it can be inferred that there is a great amount of trading not motivated by private 
information. Put differently, WTI-CME is a broader market both in terms of informed trading 
and non-information-based trading. Overall evidence regarding which market is more liquid is 
somewhat mixed: WTI-CME’s trading cost is slightly greater, but evidence strongly suggests 
that WTI-CME represents a broader market. This explains why its information share is much 
greater than that of Brent-ICE (in Table 5, information share is estimated to be 87% for WTI-
CME and 13% for Brent-ICE).  
                                                 
10   Since I include all low trading hours such as midnight, that might explain the small average trade size and low 
number of trades in Table 6.  
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables Used in Regression Analysis 
The table presents summary statistics for the explanatory variables in equation (5): volume,  
trading cost, trade size, and volatility of the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet crude 
oil futures prices traded on CME (WTI-CME) and the Brent crude oil futures prices traded on 
ICE Futures of London (Brent-ICE), during the periods January –August 2008 and September - 
December 2008. Volume is the daily volume for the traded futures contracts. Trading cost is an 
estimate of the effective bid ask spread using the Gibbs estimator described in Hasbrouck (2004). 
Trade size is the daily average trade size. Volatility is the daily standard deviation of the average 
squares of intraday returns. 
 
 Full sample  
Before financial 
crisis 
 (Jan –Aug 2008) 
 
After financial 
crisis  
(Sep - Dec 2008) 
 mean Std. dev.  mean 
Std. 
dev. 
 mean 
Std. 
dev. 
         
WTI-CME         
         
Volume(contract) 187,531 49,895  198,976 50,192  164,773 40,888 
Trading Cost ($/barrel) 0.035 0.020  0.025 0.009  0.054 0.022 
Trade size 
(contract/tick) 
2.008 0.374  2.158 0.372  1.712 0.106 
Volatility 0.221 0.113  0.157 0.038  0.348 0.105 
         
Brent-ICE         
         
Volume(contract) 97,788 34,787  105,542 25,834  82,371 44,141 
Trading Cost ($/barrel) 0.033 0.017  0.024 0.007  0.052 0.016 
Trade size 
(contract/tick) 
1.610 0.376  1.743 0.375  1.344 0.195 
Volatility 0.212 0.113  0.150 0.039  0.363 0.110 
         
 
As expected, there are drastic differences between pre and post-crisis periods.  After the 
crisis, volume and trade size decline substantially, whereas trading cost increases considerably; 
lower volume and trade size and higher trading cost are all characteristics of a less liquid market. 
The 2008 crisis resulted in a liquidity crunch, so the pattern of declining liquidity is not 
surprising. What is interesting is the differences in declining patterns in the two markets: While 
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the average trade size decreases by slightly higher than 20% in both markets, trading volume 
decreases by 17% in WTI-CME, compared to a decline of 22% in Brent-ICE. If trade size can 
serve as a proxy for informed trading, the results suggest that informed trading has declined in 
both markets, but to a greater extent in WTI-CME. This can potentially explain why the WTI-
CME’s information share, while still much larger than that of Brent-ICE, reduces after the crisis 
– Recall from Table 5, WTI-CME’s information share decreases from 97% before crisis to 87% 
after. The greater reduction in informed trading in WTI-CME is consistent with the earlier 
argument that since the crisis is global, greater interactions among markets are expected. As for 
trading cost, it more than doubles after the crisis, reflecting greater information asymmetry. The 
trading cost of WTI-CME is on average 4% greater either before or after the crisis, suggesting 
the trading cost difference between the two markets is more likely due to structural difference 
(e.g., Brent-ICE is purely electronic whereas WTI-CME has some floor trading).    
The regression results of information share on trading characteristics, equation (6), are 
displayed in Table 7.  Six different combinations of explanatory variables are performed, since 
some variables are correlated. The six regressions generally produce qualitatively similar results, 
implying that the results are robust with respect to model specifications. The full sample results 
are first discussed. In all four regressions that include relative volume, WTI-CME’s volume 
relative to Brent-ICE’s volume is significantly positively related to WTI-CME’s information 
share.  As argued earlier, volume can be thought of as a proxy for the breadth of investor base, so 
the result implies that WTI-CME, being a broader market, is more informative. Trade size is also 
positively associated with information share, but significantly so only in one of three models: 
model (3). Hence, there is some, albeit weak, evidence suggesting that bigger trades carry more 
information. The coefficient of combined volatility is significantly positive in only one out of six 
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models. As for trading cost, its coefficient is not significant in all four models that include this 
variable. This is not consistent with some prior literature that suggests trading costs play an 
important in information discovery. There are two possible explanations for the difference in 
results. First, related studies do not directly estimate bid-ask spread, and most simply assume 
bigger volume means greater liquidity. Recall that Table 6 finds WTI-CME actually has slightly 
higher trading cost despite much greater volume, casting doubt about validity of that assumption. 
Second, electronic trading has become dominant in recent years, and electronic trading tends to 
be associated with lower trading costs, as some studies show. Hence it is possible that trading 
cost might be relatively less important after mid-2000s. The R2 is not impressive; it is possible 
that other factors such as history, tax structure, regulation, as well as geographic factors could 
affect information share; unfortunately, these factors are hard to quantify.  
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Table 7: Regression Analysis of Share of Price Discovery 
The table reports the regression estimate of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet crude oil 
futures prices traded on CME (WTI-CME) price discovery share (θt
CME
) on volume, trading cost, 
trade size, and volatility. Volume is the relative volume, computed as the daily volume of the 
WTI-CME to the total volume of WTI-CME and Brent-ICE futures. TradeCost is the relative 
estimate of the effective bid ask spread of WTI-CME to Brent-ICE using the Gibbs estimator 
described in Hasbrouck (2004). Tradesize is the relative trade size defined as the trade size of 
WTI-CME to that of Brent-ICE futures. Volatility is an estimate of the daily volatility for WTI-
CME futures (i.e., the daily sums the squares of intraday returns). The t-values are given in 
parentheses. The notations ―a‖, ―b‖ and ―c‖ refer to significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. 
  Dependent variable:  WTI-CME futures contribution to price discovery 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A :Full Sample 
 
constant 0.052 0.099 0.244b 0.122 0.170 0.390a 
 (0.33) (0.66) (2.38) (0.83) (1.22)  (6.76) 
Volume 0.374c 0.372c  0.445b 0.444b  
 (1.62) (1.61)  (1.98) (1.98)  
TradeCost 0.045  0.044 0.046  0.045 
 (1.04)  (1.02) (1.06)  (1.04) 
Tradesize 0.094 0.095 0.122c    
 (1.29) (1.31) (1.72)    
Volatility 0.061 0.067 0.107 0.068 0.073 0.128c 
 (0.76) (0.83) (1.42) (0.84) (0.91)  (1.71) 
       
R2 (%) 3.80 3.38 2.79 3.16 2.73 1.65 
      
Panel B:  Before financial crisis (Jan –Aug 2008) 
       
constant 0.137 0.126 0.070 0.267 0.252 0.226b 
 (0.66) (0.64) (0.53) (1.36) (1.36)  (2.30) 
Volume -0.130 -0.127  -0.075 -0.070  
 (-0.42) (-0.41)  (-0.24) (-0.23)  
TradeCost -0.009  -0.008 -0.013  -0.013 
 (-0.17)  (-0.14) (-0.25)  (-0.23) 
Tradesize 0.138c 0.138c 0.134c    
 (1.73) (1.74) (1.70)    
Volatility 0.860a 0.852a 0.812a 0.910a 0.899a 0.881a 
 ( 2.91) (2.93) (2.99) (3.08) (3.08) (3.26) 
       
R2 (%) 7.71 7.69 7.61 6.04 6.01 6.01 
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Table 7 continued  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel C:  After financial crisis (Sep - Dec 2008) 
 
constant 0.030 0.119 0.396b -0.064 0.034 0.401a 
 (0.13) (0.52) (2.02) (-0.29) (0.16)   (3.49) 
Volume 1.042a 1.008a  0.837b 0.836b  
 (2.79) (2.66)  (2.50) (2.47)  
TradeCost 0.128c  0.119c 0.119c  0.119c 
 (1.85)  ( 1.65) (1.72)  (1.67) 
Tradesize -0.202 -0.169 0.005    
 (-1.22) (-1.02) (0.03)    
Volatility -0.143 -0.099 -0.018 -0.171 -0.126 -0.016 
 (-0.94 (-0.65) (-0.12) (-1.13) (-0.83) (-0.11) 
       
R2 (%) 11.64 7.95 3.26 10.03 6.81 3.26 
       
 
There are important differences between pre and post-crisis results, shown in Panels A 
and B, respectively. Pre-crisis results in Panel B indicate two significant variables in all 
regressions that include the two variables; namely, trade size and volatility are positively related 
to information share. The former is consistent with Easley et al. (1987) that larger trades are 
more informative. However, relative volume is not significant here. If one interprets the pre-
crisis period as relatively more ―normal‖, it might make sense that during a normal period, the 
breadth of investor matters less than larger and more informative trades. In contrast, during 
periods characterized by great uncertainty like the post-crisis period, the opposite might be true 
since some big trades might come from panic or liquidity crunch. Indeed, Panel C post-crisis 
results show that trade size is insignificantly related to information share but relative volume is. 
Another great contrast between the two periods is that, after crisis, the coefficient of volatility is 
insignificant in all regressions, suggesting that many trades might not be informative. It is 
plausible that, in a chaotic market, trading is associated with a great degree of noise, and broader 
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investor base would matter more than other trading characteristics. Finally, in Panel C trading 
cost is found to be positively correlated with information share in all four models that include it. 
This piece of result is surprising and rather counter-intuitive. However, one could argue that 
from the market maker’s standpoint, it makes sense to charge a greater spread for the more 
informative market when the degree of uncertainty is large.  To test the validity of this argument, 
I use the Granger causality Wald tests to see if WTI-CME price discovery share (θt
CME
) would 
Granger cause the relative trading cost in the high volatility periods, i.e., the months after the 
financial crisis.   
Table 8 shows the Granger causality tests for the full sample as well as the two 
subsamples.  It is clear the relative trading cost Granger caused the WTI-CME price discovery 
share in the full sample and in the months before the crisis.  However, the Granger causality 
shifts to indicate that WTI-CME price discovery share Granger caused the relative trading cost in 
the months after the financial crisis, thus supporting the argument that, in periods of high 
uncertainty, market makers would charge a greater bid-ask spread for the more informative 
market. 
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Table 8: Granger Causality Wald Tests between Information Share and Trading Costs 
The table reports the Granger causality Wald tests between the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
light, sweet crude oil futures prices traded on CME (WTI-CME) price discovery share (θt
CME
) 
and the relative trading cost (TradeCostt
CME
) measured as the relative estimate of the effective 
bid ask spread of WTI-CME to Brent-ICE using the Gibbs estimator described in Hasbrouck 
(2004). The notations ―b‖ and ―c‖ refer to significance at 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 TradeCostt
CME  θt
CME θt
CME  TradeCostt
CME 
   
Panel A: 
Full Sample 
   
chi2 9.347c 7.278 
Prob > chi2 0.053 0.122 
   
Panel B:  
January – August 2008 
   
chi2 12.838b 4.070 
Prob > chi2 0.012 0.397 
   
Panel C:  
September- December 2008 
   
chi2 3.231 10.383b 
Prob > chi2 0.520 0.034 
   
 
 
7. Robustness of the Regression Analysis 
To check the robustness of the regression results, I first use logistic transformation for 
WTI-CME price discovery share (θt
CME
) as ln(θt
CME
/1- θt
CME
).  The logistic transformation for 
θt
CME is used as the dependent variable in equation (6).  Eun and Sabherwal (2003) argue that this 
logistic transformation is necessary to insure that the predicted regression value falls in the [0, 1] 
range.  The regression results using the logistic transformation for θt
CME as dependent variable 
are presented in Appendix A.  This change does not alter the results. 
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Second, I use other proxies for the volatility: the Parkinson (1980) extreme value 
volatility estimator and the Garman and Klass (1980) extreme value volatility estimator.  The 
extreme value volatility estimators are used since they tend to be more efficient during periods of 
great volatility as in 2008, having alternative measures of volatility seems desirable.    
Parkinson (1980) was first to propose an extreme value volatility estimator based upon 
the joint density function of high (Ht) and low (Lt) prices at day t, following the Geometric 
Brownian motion.  He shows that his estimator is up to five times more efficient than the 
traditional volatility estimator.  Parkinson (1980)’s extreme value volatility estimator (VolP) can 
be written as follows: 
 



n
t
ttp LH
n
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1
2)(ln
2ln4
1
.          (15) 
 
Garman and Klass (1980) suggest another extreme value volatility estimator 
incorporating the opening (Ot) and the closing (Ct) prices, they show that this measure is 
approximately up to 8.4 times more efficient than the traditional volatility estimator.  Garman 
and Klass (1980)’s extreme value volatility estimator (VolGK) is given by: 
 
22 383.0)2)((019.0)(511.0 ttttttttGK CLHLHCLHVol  .               (16) 
 
The regression results using Parkinson (1980)’s extreme value volatility estimator and 
Garman and Klass (1980)’s extreme value volatility estimator as proxies for volatility do not 
show any major changes from those in Table 7.  
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8. Conclusion 
 This paper empirically analyzes the effects of trading characteristics on the information 
share of two major exchanges on crude oil, Chicago mercantile Exchange (CME) and 
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), using trade-by-trade data in 2008. The case of oil futures 
market is interesting because oil is without doubt among the most important commodities and oil 
futures is among the most liquid futures contracts in the world. The results should provide 
implications for the role of trading characteristics on the relative leadership of markets. Trading 
characteristics examined in the study include trading volume, trade size, and trading costs. In 
contrast, most related studies analyze trading volume only. To estimate the information share, the 
common factor components (CFC) model of Gonzalo and Granger (1995) is employed. As for 
trading cost, since bid-ask spread data is unavailable, Hasbrouck (2004)’s spread estimator that 
involves repeated sampling is utilized. 
 Another important objective of the study is to compare the periods before and after 
September 2008, when the collapse of housing finance produced a global liquidity crunch. While 
the crisis was not directly linked to the oil market, like other markets the oil market was affected 
by the ensuing liquidity and confidence crisis; the rapid increase in oil price during summer 2008 
might have contributed to or triggered the crisis.  
 Not too surprisingly, WTI-CME is characterized by greater trading volume and greater 
average trade size, relative to Brent-ICE. Somewhat surprisingly, the bid-ask spread in WTI-
CME is on average 4% greater than that in Brent-ICE. An implication is that liquidity should not 
be measured by one dimension or one variable alone. Nevertheless, WTI-CME’s overall liquidity 
appears to be greater, as there is some evidence that it’s slightly higher trading cost might be due 
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to structural differences in trading systems. Not surprisingly, in 2008 the information share of 
WTI-CME averages 87%, substantially greater than that of Brent-ICE’s 13%.  
 The information share of WTI-CME and trading characteristics that most affect 
information share vary substantially between pre and post crisis periods. During the pre-crisis 
period, relative trade size and volatility are positively related to WTI-CME’s information share. 
The former is consistent with Easley and O’Hara (1987) theory that larger trades are more likely 
to be motivated by private information. The greater number of large trades in CME is one reason 
for the dominant information share of WTI-CME before the crisis: 97%. After the crisis, 
however, WTI-CME’s share drops to 87%. Moreover, trade size is no longer a significant 
explanatory variable for information share; rather, trading volume is. During liquidity crunch it is 
reasonable to expect that trading might contain a great degree of noise thus trade size carries no 
credible information. A broader market, as represented by greater volume, would be more 
informative. The results are fairly robust, as different regression specifications and different 
variable measurements produce virtually the same results. 
 As for trading costs, several studies suggest that they play an important role in 
information discovery. Here the results contradict that conjecture. There are two possible 
explanations. First, previous studies on futures market interactions do not estimate bid-ask spread 
directly whereas this study does. Second, spread has been in a declining trend, especially after 
the advancement of electronic trading systems. Finally, it is interesting to note in the post-crisis 
period, spread is found to be significantly positively related to information share. A possible 
explanation is that, during period of great uncertainty, market makers set greater spreads to more 
informed market, as a protection for greater likelihood of adverse selection problem (i.e., trading 
with more informed traders). Indeed, causality tests indicate that causality runs from spread to 
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information share before the crisis but the opposite conclusion holds during the post-crisis 
period. 
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Appendix A 
Regression Analysis of Share of Price Discovery 
 
The table reports the daily regression estimate the logistic transformation of West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet crude oil futures prices traded on CME (WTI-CME) price 
discovery share (θt
CME
) on volume, trading cost, trade size, and volatility. Volume is the relative 
volume, computed as the daily volume of the WTI-CME to the total volume of WTI-CME and 
Brent-ICE futures. TradeCost is the relative estimate of the effective bid ask spread of WTI-
CME to Brent-ICE using the Gibbs estimator described in Hasbrouck (2004). Tradesize is the 
relative trade size defined as the trade size of WTI-CME to that of Brent-ICE futures. Volatility 
is an estimate of the daily volatility for WTI-CME futures (i.e., sums the squares of intraday 
returns). The total number of daily observations is 257. The t-values are given in parentheses. 
The notations ―a‖, ―b‖ and ―c‖ refer to significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: logistic transformation of WTI-CME futures contribution to price discovery 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A :Full Sample 
 
constant -2.895a -2.640a -1.572a -2.471a -2.207a -0.660b 
 (-3.31) (-3.15) (-2.74) (-3.01) (-2.83) (-2.04) 
Volume 2.580b 2.567b  3.009b 3.001b  
 (2.00) (1.99)  (2.40) (2.39)  
TradeCost 0.245  0.241 0.250  0.246 
 (1.02)  (0.99) (1.04)  (1.01) 
Tradesize 0.568 0.574 0.760b    
 (1.40) (1.42) (1.92)    
Volatility 0.416 0.446 0.732c 0.455 0.486 0.862b 
 (0.93) (1.00) (1.73) (1.01) (1.09) (2.06) 
       
R2 (%) 5.06 4.67 3.55 4.32 3.91 2.15 
       
Panel B:  Before financial crisis (Jan –Aug 2008) 
       
constant -2.922 -2.904b -2.641a -2.097c -2.110 -1.609a 
 (-2.46) (-2.58) (-3.48) (-1.88) (-2.00) (-2.88) 
Volume 0.547 0.541  0.896 0.901  
 (0.31) (0.31)  (0.51) (0.51)  
TradeCost 0.016  0.010 -0.012  -0.022 
 (0.05)  (0.03) (-0.04)  (-0.07) 
Tradesize 0.878b 0.877b 0.892b    
 (1.94) (1.94) (1.98)    
Volatility 4.277b 4.289b 4.477a 4.597a 4.588a 4.937a 
 ( 2.55) (2.59) (2.90) (2.73) (2.76)   (3.21) 
       
R2 (%) 8.09 8.09 8.04 6.00 6.00 5.86 
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Appendix A continued 
Dependent variable: logistic transformation of WTI-CME futures contribution to price discovery 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel C:  After financial crisis (Sep - Dec 2008) 
 
constant -2.390c -1.939 -0.401 -2.904b -2.411b -0.380 
 (-1.91) (-1.56) (-0.37) (-2.45) (-2.09) (-0.61) 
Volume 0.059a 5.498a  4.545b 4.543b  
 (2.78) (2.66)   (2.48) (2.46)  
TradeCost 0.651c  0.599 0.601c  0.600 
 (1.72)  (1.53) (1.59)  (1.55) 
Tradesize -1.107 -0.940 0.020    
 (-1.23) (-1.04) (0.02)    
Volatility -0.820 -0.599 -0.141 -0.973 -0.744 -0.135 
 (-0.98) (-0.72) (-0.17) (-1.18) (-0.90) (-0.17) 
       
R2 (%) 11.14 7.93 2.78 9.51 6.74 2.78 
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Appendix B 
Correlation Matrix 
 
Volume is the relative volume, computed as the daily volume of the WTI-CME to the total 
volume of WTI-CME and Brent-ICE futures. TradeCost is the relative estimate of the effective 
bid ask spread of WTI-CME to Brent-ICE using the Gibbs estimator described in Hasbrouck 
(2004). Tradesize is the relative trade size defined as the trade size of WTI-CME to that of Brent-
ICE futures. Volatility is an estimate of the daily volatility for WTI-CME futures (i.e., sums the 
squares of intraday returns). 
 
Volume TradeCost Tradesize Volatility 
Panel A :Full Sample 
     Volume 1.000 
   TradeCost 0.021 1.000 
  Tradesize 0.278 0.024 1.000 
 Volatility 0.379 0.070 0.162 1.000 
     Panel B:  Before financial crisis (Jan –Aug 2008) 
     Volume 1.000 
   TradeCost -0.012 1.000 
  Tradesize 0.153 -0.033 1.000 
 Volatility 0.395 0.125 0.145 1.000 
     Panel C:  After financial crisis (Sep - Dec 2008) 
 Volume 1.000 
   TradeCost 0.078 1.000 
  Tradesize 0.526 0.154 1.000 
 Volatility 0.414 0.189 0.348 1.000 
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Chapter 2 
Factors Affecting Backwardation in Crude Oil Futures Price 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Backwardation is a market condition in which futures prices is lower than the spot price 
for a certain commodity.  For crude oil, Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) observe that oil 
futures prices are often backwardated; specifically they find that strong backwardation -- futures 
price less than the spot price -- occurs 77% of the time in oil futures markets, while weak 
backwardation -- discounted oil futures price less than the spot price -- occurs 94% of the time 
over the period of February 1984 through April 1992.  Knetsch (2007) also confirms 
Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) observation, that oil market is weakly backwarded in most 
cases
11
.   
Using on the supply/demand argument, backwardation occurs when unexpected supply 
shortage appears, causing a short-term upward price movement.  In this case, consumers pay a 
premium to take delivery of commodities right away to ensure a security level for the 
commodity.  This will raise spot price directly by shifting the demand curve upward given a 
vertical supply curve.   
The main goal of this study is to examine the influence of expected oil price volatility, 
the behavior of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the US Dollar 
                                                 
11
 According to Knetsch’s observation there were two periods in which oil futures did not exhibit backwardation.  
The first period was around the winter 1998–1999, and the second period in the summer of 2004 until the end of his 
sample period of 2006. 
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exchange rate volatility on oil futures backwardation.  Both Dollar value
12
 and OPEC behavior 
are believed to be important factors affecting oil price; this study hypothesizes that they also 
affect the relation between spot and futures prices of oil, since uncertainties about exchange rate 
and OPEC policies (and deviations from them) increase the uncertainties about future 
supply/demand, thus altering the connection between spot and futures prices.  With regard to 
exchange rate, the paper incorporates the effects of the volatility of the US exchange rate on 
crude oil backwardation.  As for the role of OPEC behavior, the study examines OPEC 
production quota imposed on its members and OPEC member’s overproduction (difference 
between quota and the actual production).  Additionally, the impact of oil fund activity is 
examined; since oil funds are relatively new however, the analysis involving oil fund activity 
utilizes a much shorter sample period. Studying these factors can improve our understanding of 
the spot-futures relation.  To my knowledge, there is no similar study that incorporates these 
factors as potential explanations for backwardation in the oil market.  
As for the role of oil price volatility, Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) offer an 
explanation for the backwardation in oil futures based on the option pricing theory
13
.  They argue 
that backwardation of crude oil prices is a necessary condition for crude oil production and that 
greater uncertainty regarding future crude oil prices will lead to a stronger backwardation. 
Specifically, Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) view crude oil reserve as a call option written 
on the spot price of oil with the strike price equal to the extraction cost.  Option pricing theory 
predicts that option value is greater the greater the volatility of the underlying asset. In 
equilibrium, their theory predicts a negative association between production and oil price 
                                                 
12
 The US Dollar has been the major currency used in oil transactions. 
13
 The earliest option pricing model that derives a closed-form solution for option is due Black and Scholes (1973).  
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volatility; this is because the value of the oil reserve is greater the greater the price volatility. 
Consequently when price volatility is higher, the value of oil reserve is higher, thus production is 
typically lower and backwardation must be greater to encourage current production. That is, their 
theory predicts a positive association between backwardation and volatility.  
Other related studies on backwardation analyze the notion of convenience yield (see 
Kaldor; 1939, Working; 1948) and the supply/demand imbalances (see Alquist and Kilian; 2010 
and Milonas and Henker; 2001) as potential explanations for backwardation in futures prices of 
storable commodities.  The convenience yield is defined as an implicit dividend that accrues to 
the holder of the commodity. In sum, previous studies examine several factors that explain the 
crude oil price backwardation, including supply/demand uncertainty, price volatility, seasonality, 
and maturity.  However, none of these studies took into consideration the effects of the US 
Dollar exchange rate volatility and OPEC’s behavior. 
Given that crude oil is one of the most essential energy sources and that there is 
considerable fluctuation in oil supply, which depends on a variety of macroeconomic and 
political factors, crude oil market has witnessed high volatility.  For example, in 1997, when the 
world economy was already in a recession, OPEC failed to predict the oil demand correctly and 
increased its production levels that resulted in a huge decrease in oil prices. In June-July 2008, a 
combination of supply uncertainties in oil producing countries and a falling US Dollar caused an 
unprecedented oil price spike.  Horan, Peterson, and Mahar (2004) examine the behavior of 
crude oil implied volatility surrounding OPEC meetings, their results show that volatility drifts 
upward as the meeting approaches.  The implied volatility is the volatility implied from the 
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market price of an option on oil, based on an option pricing model14. On the reverse, an 
appreciation of the US Dollar and signs of worldwide economic slowdown led to a sharp 
decrease in oil price toward the end of 2008. In fact, the US Dollar exchange rate is a key 
determinant of the world oil markets because world oil prices are denominated in US Dollars, a 
stronger Dollar pushes up world oil prices measured in local currencies, even if the Dollar price 
is unchanged.  Conversely, when the Dollar falls, OPEC members receive smaller revenues in 
terms of their domestic currencies, causing substantial cuts in their purchasing power. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In section one I provide more 
systematic review of the related literature.  Section two describes the data. Section three 
discusses oil backwardation. Section four discusses the potential role of expected oil price 
volatility, OPEC behavior, and the US Dollar exchange rate volatility on the backwardation of 
crude oil futures. Section five concludes.   
 
1. Literature Review  
 
There are two well-known theories of the relationship between the futures and the spot 
prices; the theory of storage and the theory of normal backwardation. The theory of storage was 
initially developed by Kaldor (1939) and Working (1949). According to the theory of storage, 
the difference between contemporaneous spot and futures prices is explained by the following 
factors: the interest rate in storing a commodity, storage costs, and convenience yield. This can 
be expressed as:  
 
                                                 
14
 The most well-known implied volatility is so called the VIX index, which represents the implied volatility of S&P 
500 stocks. It is computed from the market price of options on S&P 500 stocks. The VIX index is published daily 
in financial media. 
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                                         TtTtTtttTt ycrSSF ,,,, )(  ,     (1) 
 
where Ft,T is the price of futures at time t for delivery at time T. St is the spot price at time t. rt is 
the interest rate. ctT is the marginal cost of storage. ytT is the marginal convenience yield. 
Accordingly a high inventory level implies a lower probability of a stock-out in the future, that 
is, convenience yields are negatively related to inventory levels. This relationship is stronger for 
a commodity that is more sensitive to seasonality or supply/demand effect.  Therefore, 
convenience yield plays a central role in explaining the benefits of holding inventory during 
periods of unexpected demand/supply shock. Fama and French (1987, 1988) perform tests on the 
theory of storage and present empirical evidence that in periods of increasing volatility and risk, 
convenience yields increase for a wide variety of metals prices (aluminum, copper, nickel, and 
lead). 
Another view of commodity futures is the theory of normal backwardation, which 
compares futures prices to expected future spot prices. The theory of normal backwardation 
views futures markets as a risk transfer mechanism between long investors earn a risk premium 
for bearing future spot risk and the commodity producers who want to hedge. This theory builds 
on the view that the basis consists of two components: a risk premium and the expected 
appreciation or depreciation of the future spot price. 
According to the theory of normal backwardation, deviations of futures prices from 
expected future spot prices stem from a risk premium, which arises if long or short traders are 
more risk-averse than their counterparts. It is generally accepted that futures markets provide 
insurance to hedgers by ensuring the transfer of price risk to speculators. The insurance that net 
hedgers are willing to pay equals to the premium earned by speculators for this risk bearing. If 
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long hedgers are more risk averse than their counterparts, futures prices would lie above the 
expected future spot price and the long hedgers would have to pay a premium to induce short 
traders into taking opposite position in the future. This situation is referred as contango. On the 
other hand, if short traders are more risk averse than their counterparts, futures prices would lie 
below the expected future spot price and the short hedger pays a premium for being able to shift 
risk burden to the opposite party. This situation is referred to as normal backwardation. 
Backwardation in crude oil prices is inconsistent with Hotelling's (1931) theory. 
Hotelling (1931) derived the commonly used rule to determine the optimal extraction time-path 
for a non-renewable resource. Hotelling's rule states that under certainty the net price of an 
exhaustible resource rises over time at the rate of interest. The rationale is that if prices would 
move differently, it would be worthwhile to shift production between periods. This is the 
simplest and most commonly cited form of Hotelling's rule and uses. However, in Hotelling's 
simplest model specification, price and net price can be interchangeably used because extraction 
costs are assumed to be zero. Hence price is equal to net price (price minus marginal cost) given 
that marginal extraction cost is zero by assumption. 
Its existence, which has attracted considerable attention, represents a puzzle because of 
the violation of the optimal inter-temporal inventory holding under certainty.  Empirical tests of 
the Hotelling’s theory include testing the relationship between growth in mineral prices and 
interest rate (e.g., see Heal and Barrow, 1980; Smith, 1981).  In general the results of these tests 
have not been strongly supportive.  In petroleum, Cairns and Davis (2001), Thompson (2001), 
Adelman (1991), and Adelman and Watkins (2005) test the theory using reserve data from US 
petroleum reserve transactions.  They find that the empirical evidence is not consistent with the 
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predictions of the Hotelling’s theory; they argue that the Hotelling’s theory cannot hold under 
uncertainties.  
Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) develop a model based on the option pricing theory.  
In their model, oil reserve is viewed as a call option on oil, and therefore its value is greater the 
greater the oil price volatility (based on the option pricing theory).  They view backwardation as 
the price to pay for the producers to refrain from keeping oil in the ground.  Prior to Litzenberger 
and Rabinowitz (1995) theory, no model had predicted any association between backwardation 
and volatility. They argue that backwardation of crude oil prices is a necessary condition for 
crude oil production and greater uncertainty regarding future crude oil prices will lead to stronger 
backwardation because greater uncertainty means higher value of oil reserve (i.e., greater 
tendency to keep oil in the ground).  Stated differently, Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) 
model considers the effects of oil price volatility and examines the relation between volatility 
and the slope of the forward curve.  When volatility is high, the value of delaying production 
increases, causing current prices to increase relative to future prices. Their model implies that, 
when riskiness increases, oil production is non-increasing and inter-temporal oil price spreads 
are non-decreasing. In specific, their theory predicts a positive association between 
backwardation and volatility. Regressing weak backwardation on the implied volatility of the at-
the-money put option price using the Black (1976) formula, Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) 
using data on U.S. oil production, U.S. oil reserves, and west Texas intermediate futures and 
options prices show that the coefficient on implied volatility is significantly positive over the 
period from December 1986 through December 1991. 
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) as well as Gibson and Schwartz (1990) study the marginal 
convenience yield; they argue that backwardation should be equal to the present value of the 
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marginal convenience yield of the commodity inventory. The convenience yield is the benefit of 
owning the physical asset and it measures the market’s expectations about the future availability 
of the commodity. The higher the perceived risk of future shortages in supply, the higher the 
convenience yield. If the convenience yield is high enough and exceeds the cost of carry, the 
future market is likely to shift into backwardation. With a low or negative convenience yield, the 
future market is likely to stay in contango.  
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and Gibson and Schwartz (1990) derive the market price 
for pricing petroleum assets based on the observable term structure of petroleum futures markets.  
Although motivated by the time series properties of the forward convenience yield of crude oil, 
Gibson and Schwartz (1990) developed an empirical model of pricing assets, which explicitly 
model a risk-premium based on stochastic price movements.  They use the adjacent monthly 
maturities futures prices and annualized riskless interest rate between January 1984 and 
November 1988 to compute the implied convenience yield that is not directly observable.  Their 
results show that the stochastic convenience yield has a strong mean reversing tendency. 
Larson (1994) develops a stochastic arbitrage equation to explain backwardation in 
refined copper.  Extending on Larson (1994) work, Considine and Larson (2001) show that the 
equilibrium value of oil inventory contains: the conventional Hotelling’s theory, the convenience 
yield from the theory of storage, and an option value related to price uncertainty.  Their results 
suggest that convenience yield and risk premium are important elements of crude oil 
backwardation.  In fact, Carlson, Khokher, and Titman (2007) develop a model related to 
Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) model.  In their model they relax Litzenberger and 
Rabinowitz (1995) assumption that producers are not able to extract all of an oil well’s reserves 
at an arbitrary point.  Carlson et al. (2007) analysis shows that volatility of price changes can 
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arise as a natural consequence of the production decisions made by value maximizing resource 
owners and that this volatility is related to the extent of backwardation as well as contango 
(futures price greater than spot price). 
Milonas and Henker (2001) argue that backwardation could be explained by supply and 
demand imbalances.  They model the Brent crude oil and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) futures 
spread as a function of the convenience yields of the two contracts.  They use convenience yields 
as surrogates for supply and demand conditions in the two markets and find that convenience 
yields can explain the variation in the spread.  This indicates that the regional supply and demand 
imbalance is an important factor in determining oil futures prices.  In a recent study, Alquist and 
Kilian (2010) also view supply and demand imbalance as an explanation of oil futures 
backwardation.  They show that the overshooting of the price of oil in response to oil-market 
specific demand shocks coincides with the predictions of theoretical models of precautionary 
demand shocks driven by increased uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls.  Using oil 
futures market data since 1989, Alquist and Kilian (2010) show that the movements in the price 
of oil induced by this shock are highly correlated (as high as 80%), with independent measures 
of the precautionary demand component of the real price of oil based on crude oil futures prices.  
Another important supply side factor is the behavior of OPEC-countries. OPEC uses 
several instruments to control the oil market.  Since 1983 OPEC has announced the production 
quota of all its member countries in an attempt to stabilize crude oil prices by controlling oil 
production.
15
 OPEC uses eight criteria, that are oil related factors and socio-economic, for 
allocating quotas. These include the following: oil reserves, production capacity, historical 
                                                 
15 Over the years, the OPEC quota system has essentially never worked, since OPEC has no way to enforce 
compliance by its members, and because there were always member’s dissatisfied with their assigned quotas. 
That’s why oil production by OPEC members generally exceeded the production ceiling. 
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production share, domestic oil consumption, population, dependence on oil exports, and external 
debt.  
 Moebert (2007) find a modest influence of OPEC’s capacity utilization on crude oil. His 
findings imply that the upward trend at the spot market can be explained by an increasing crude 
oil demand of emerging markets rather than OPEC’s market power. In fact, he views OPEC as a 
passive observer than a price setter.  The findings of Moebert (2007) are unlike Kaufmann et al. 
(2004) who study OPEC behavior between 1984 and 2002 using data on OPEC quota (defined as 
the quantity of oil to be produced by OPEC members), OPEC overproduction (the quantity of oil 
produced minus the OPEC quota), and capacity utilization.  They show that OPEC can influence 
real oil prices, while their econometric specification can produce accurate in-sample static and 
dynamic forecasts.  Horan, Peterson, and Mahar (2004) examine the behavior of crude oil 
implied volatility surrounding OPEC meetings, and their results show that volatility drifts 
upward as the meeting approaches.  Similarly, Wang, Wu, and Yang (2008) show that the 
realized crude oil futures volatility responds with an increase in the weeks immediately before 
the OPEC events recommending price increases. 
 
2. Data  
 
  The study uses West Texas International (WTI) light, sweet crude oil futures to analyze 
the impacts of oil volatility, OPEC behavior, and the US Dollar exchange rate volatility on 
backwardation during the period from January 1986 to December 2008. WTI futures data are 
obtained from the US Energy Information Administration.
16
 The futures data include the four 
                                                 
16  www.eia.doe.gov  
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shortest maturity contracts from 1-month to 4-months.
17
 The futures prices are the official daily 
closing prices at 2:30 p.m. from the trading floor of the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX) for a specific delivery month for each product listed. Each contract expires on the 
third business day prior to the 25th calendar day of the month proceeding the delivery month.  If 
the 25th calendar day of the month is a non-business day, trading ceases on the third business day 
prior to the business day proceeding the 25th calendar day.   
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Futures Prices 
The table summarizes the daily logarithm of the 1-month, 2-month, 3-month, and 4-month West 
Texas Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet crude oil futures price series from January 1986 to 
December 2008. WTI futures daily data are obtained from the US Energy Information 
Administration.  The notation ―a‖ refers to significance at 1% level. 
 
 
1-month 
futures 
 
2-month 
futures 
 
3-month 
futures 
 
4-month 
futures 
        
Mean 3.265  3.261  3.257  3.253 
Variance 0.292  0.294  0.295  0.296 
Minimum 2.344  2.355  2.359  2.371 
Maximum 4.979  4.983  4.984  4.987 
Skewness 1.110a  1.142a  1.175a  1.208a 
Kurtosis 3.458a  3.471a  3.500a  3.539a 
No. of 
observations 
5,708  5,708  5,708  5,708 
        
 
                                                 
17
 The 1-month futures contract is the nearest to maturity contract and its time to expiration ranges from one day to 
thirty one days. The 2-month contract has one additional month to expiration. The 3-month has two additional 
months, etc. 
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Table 1 provides summary statistics of the four months logarithm daily futures price 
series. The total number of observations is 5,708 spanning from January 1986 to December 
2008.  It can be seen that the mean value for the logarithm futures price decreases as the month 
of maturity increased. The price series in all four maturity contacts show statistically significant 
positive kurtosis, indicating a leptokurtic, or fat tail.   
 
3. Oil Backwardation 
 
As discussed above crude oil futures prices are often backwardated (Knetsch, 2007 and 
Litzenberger and Rabinowitz, 1995). Table 2 presents a summary statistics of strong and weak 
backwardation for the WTI futures with maturity contracts for two-month, three-month and four-
month contracts. Strong backwardation SBt is defined as the spot price being higher than the 
futures price: 
                                            0,  tntt FSSB  ,                                                        (2) 
where St is the price of the 1-month futures contract (which is used as a proxy for the spot price), 
Fn,t is the price of the n-th month futures contract. Weak backwardation WBt is defined as the 
spot price being higher than the discounted futures price: 
                                      0, 

tn
nr
tt FeSWB
t ,                      
 (3)  
where r is the 3-month Treasury bill. From Table 2, it can be seen that the level of backwardation 
is higher for the far month’s futures contracts than that of the nearby futures contracts.  For 
example, the level of strong backwardation of 2-month futures contract is $0.261, while the 
backwardation level for the 3-month and 4-month futures are $0.445 and $0.643, respectively. 
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Furthermore, the values of weak backwardation are $0.06, $0.145, and $0.246 for the 2-month, 
3-month, and 4-month futures contracts, respectively. This is also true for the fraction of time 
futures prices are backwardated: being higher for the far month’s futures than the nearby 
contracts. The table shows that oil futures contracts are, on average, strongly backwardated 57% 
of the time and weakly backwardated 69% of the time during the period from January 1986 to 
December 2008.   
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Oil Backwardation 
The table reports a summary statistics of the strong and weak backwardation of the 1-month, 2-
month, 3-month, and 4-month West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet crude oil futures price 
series from January 1986 to December 2008. Strong backwardation is measured as the difference 
between the price of the 1-month futures contract (proxy of spot price) and the futures price of 
the n-th month futures contract. Weak backwardation is measured as the difference between the 
price of the 1-month futures contract and discounted futures price of the n-th month futures 
contract. 
Futures contract 2-month  3-month  4-month  
 Panel A: strong backwardation ($) 
    
Mean 0.261 0.445 0.643 
Standard Deviation 0.686 1.132 1.491 
Median 0.209 0.391 0.575 
Minimum -8.489 -11.288 -13.277 
Maximum 11.785 12.401 12.607 
    
 Panel B: weak  backwardation ($) 
    
Mean 0.060 0.145 0.246 
Standard Deviation 0.702 1.163 1.537 
Median 0.050 0.160 0.260 
Minimum -8.490 -11.290 -13.280 
Maximum 11.550 12.050 12.140 
    
 Panel C: Fraction of the Time in Backwardation (in%) 
    
Strong 54.61 57.38 59.95 
Weak 67.71 68.62 70.41 
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Figures 1-A, 1-B, 1-C, 2-A, 2-B, and 2-C display the spot price vs. the strong and weak 
backwardation of the 2-month, 3-month and 4-month futures contracts, respectively. As shown 
from these figures, the market experiences backwardation between 1986 and 2004, while it has 
some prolong periods of contango (which lasted more than 12 months) in 1998 and between 
February 2005 to June 2007.   
Figure 1:Crude Oil Spot Price and Strong Backwardation in Oil Futures 
(January 1986 – December 2008) 
 
The figures 1-A, 1-B, and 1-C show the daily futures price for the 1-month futures contract, a 
proxy for the spot price, and the strong backwardation of the 2-month, 3-month and 4-motnh 
futures contracts. Strong backwardation is measured as the difference between the price of the 1-
month futures contract (proxy of spot price) and futures price of the n-th month futures contract. 
 
 
 (A) Spot price and strong backwardation of the 2-month WTI crude oil futures contract. 
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(B) Spot price and strong backwardation of the 3-month WTI crude oil futures contract. 
 
 
 
(C) Spot price and strong backwardation of the 4-month WTI crude oil futures contract. 
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Figure 2: Crude Oil Spot Price and Weak Backwardation in Oil Futures 
 (January 1986 – December 2008) 
 
The figures 2-A, 2-B, and 2-C show the daily futures price for the 1-month futures contract, a 
proxy for the spot price, and the weak backwardation of the 2-month, 3-month and 4-motnh 
futures contracts. Weak backwardation is measured as the difference between the price of the 1-
month futures contract (proxy of spot price) and discounted futures price of the n-th month 
futures contract. 
 
 
(A) Spot price and weak backwardation of the 2-month WTI crude oil futures contract. 
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(B) Spot price and weak backwardation of the 3-month WTI crude oil futures contract. 
 
 
 
(C) Spot price and weak backwardation of the 4-month WTI crude oil futures contract. 
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The contango period of 1998 was associated with a declining trend of the crude oil prices. 
This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that in periods of contango oil producers 
accumulate inventories that is interpreted by the market participants as an increase of crude oil 
supply relative to demand. This would result in pushing the price of oil for immediate delivery to 
go down. Contrary to this notion, the 2005-2007 contango period was associated with an upward 
trend in oil prices despite of the rise of inventories. Morse (2006) argues that high levels of 
inventories are no longer seen as a necessary sign of oversupply. Furthermore, Fattouh (2007) 
argues that this transformation is due to the absence of spare capacity, and the decline in oil price 
caused by rising inventories is continuously being dominated by other factors causing oil prices 
to rise. 
 
4. Factors Affecting Backwardation 
 
The study examines the influence of oil price volatility, the behavior of OPEC, and the 
US Dollar exchange rate volatility, on the backwardation of crude oil futures. The extent of oil 
strong and weak backwardation is used as the dependent variable in a regression analysis. 
The study variables of main interest are volatility, quota, over, and Dollar_vol, where 
volatility is the realized volatility of crude oil futures, quota is the OPEC crude oil production 
ceiling allocation measured in 1,000 barrel/day, over is the OPEC overproduction rate defined as 
the actual production rate minus OPEC quota measured in 1,000 barrel/day, and Dollar_vol is 
the volatility of the US Dollar exchange rate against the British Pound and Japanese Yen. The 
regression is estimated using the White (1980) correction to account for heteroskedasticity. 
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Figure 3: OPEC Crude Oil Production and Quota 
 
The figure shows the monthly average crude oil production by Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), measured in 1,000 barrel/day, and the OPEC crude oil production 
ceiling, measured in 1,000 barrel/day, during January 1999 – December 2008. Monthly data are 
obtained from OPEC annual statistical reports (2002-2009). 
 
 
 
To test the impact of OPEC polices on oil price backwardation, the study employs two 
variables: OPEC crude oil production allocation to its members, quota, and OPEC 
overproduction rate by its members, Over.
18
  The daily and monthly data for these variables are 
obtained from OPEC annual statistical bulletin from 2002 to 2008.  Figure 3 shows that the 
monthly average of the actual oil production always exceeds the agreed production ceiling 
allocation during January 1999 to December 2008. On average, the overproduction is around 3 
                                                 
18
The monthly data for the actual OPEC production rate is only available from January 1999. 
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million barrel/day, which is 12% above the average quota. It can be argued that this deviation 
will discourage current oil production and result in greater backwardation levels. 
Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) test their theory by regressing weak backwardation 
on the implied volatility of the at-the-money put option price using the Black (1976) formula. 
Theoretically, implied volatility reflects option traders’ collective estimate of what volatility will 
be during the life of an option contract. This study does not use implied volatility, since data on 
oil options is unavailable to the author. Additionally, studies such as Martin, Reidy, and Wright 
(2009), Neely (2009), and Martens and Zein (2004) find that implied volatility is not a superior 
forecaster of future volatility, compared to historical volatility. Moreover, since volatility is time-
varying, it is entirely possible that investors might place more weight on recent volatility than on 
volatility in the distant past (based on behavioral finance argument). Consequently, future 
volatility might be better estimated by using weighting schemes such as exponential weighting 
scheme and Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) (e.g. Foster 
and Nelson, 1996, Andreou and Ghysels, 2002, and Guidi, 2009). A brief comparison of 
alternative volatility estimates is given below. 
There are three important approaches to estimate volatility: the traditional method, the 
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA), and the Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model.  A brief comparison of these estimates is given 
below. 
The traditional method estimates volatility as the standard deviation of the first difference 
logarithm of futures price series as follows, 
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where 2n  is the variance rate on day n using the most recent m observations on the ui (the 
continuously compounded return during day i).  Si is the futures price at the end of day i. 
Equation (4) can be written as below to give recent data more weight since the objective is to 
estimate the current level of volatility:  
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The EWMA is a particular case of equation (5), in which the weights i decrease 
exponentially as we move back through time. Specifically, i=i, where  is a constant 
between 0 and 1. The equation below shows the simple formula for updating volatility estimates 
using this weighting scheme  
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Substituting 22 2
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GARCH(1,1) model introduced by Bollerslev (1986) is the most widely used 
specification to forecast conditional variances. The (1,1) in parentheses is a standard notation in 
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which the first number refers to how many autoregressive lags appear in the equation, while the 
second number refers to how many lags are included in the moving average component of a 
variable. In GARCH(1,1), 2n  is calculated from a long-run average variance rate, VL, n-1, and 
un-1. The equation for GARCH(1,1) is 
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  nnLn uV  ,                                                                              (8) 
 
where  is the weight assigned to VL,  is the weight assigned to
2
1nu , and  is the weight 
assigned to 2 1n , such that ++=1. In fact, the EWMA model is a particular case of 
GARCH(1,1) where =0, =1-, and =. The GARCH(1,1) model also can be written as        
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where =VL and +<1, to ensure the long variance is positive. Thus, the unconditional 
variance for the n-th futures contract is var(Pt) = . 
This study uses two estimates for the realized volatility: the monthly standard deviation 
of the first difference logarithm of futures price series and the monthly estimates of realized 
volatility using GARCH model. Figure 4 shows the realized volatility of oil over the sample 
period (1986-2008).  It shows that the largest volatility shocks occur in 1986 when oil prices fell 
by nearly $10 per barrel; in 1990 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; and in 2008 that was 
probably caused by excessive speculation on oil prices. 
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Figure 4: Realized Volatility for Oil Futures 
 
This figure shows the monthly realized volatility measured as the standard deviation of the 4- 
month WTI futures during the period from January 1986 to December 2008.  Monthly prices for 
WTI futures contract are obtained from the US Energy Information Administration. 
 
 
The study also analyzes the impact of US Dollar exchange rate volatility on oil price 
backwardation. The most widely used measure of exchange rate volatility is the standard 
deviation of the first difference logarithms of exchange rate. The daily exchange rates are 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank Reports/WRDS. The standard deviation is calculated 
over a one-month period. It is expected that the extent of backwardation is greater the greater the 
exchange Dollar volatility. The uncertainty of the Dollar exchange will discourage current oil 
production; hence greater backwardations will be needed to encourage current production.  
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Table 3: Regression Analysis of Weak Backwardation 
 
The table reports the regression results using monthly data of weak backwardation for the 2-
month, 3-month, and 4-month futures contract, using the White (1980) correction, on oil 
volatility, OPEC quota and overproduction, volatility of US Dollar exchange rate, and the spot 
price, during January 1999 – December 2008. Weak backwardation is measured as the difference 
between the price of the 1-month futures contract (proxy of spot price) and discounted futures 
price of the n-th month futures contract. Volatility is the realized volatility of crude oil futures, 
measured as the standard deviation of the first difference logarithm of the n-th month futures 
price. Quota is the OPEC crude oil production ceiling measured in 1,000 barrel/day. Over is the 
OPEC overproduction rate defined as the actual production rate minus OPEC quota measured in 
1,000 barrel/day. Dollar_vol ($/£) is the volatility of the US Dollar exchange rate against the 
British Pound. Dollar_vol ($/¥) is the volatility of the US Dollar exchange rate against the 
Japanese Yen. Spot is the price of the 1-month futures contract, used as a proxy for the spot 
price. The t-values are given in parentheses. The notations ―a‖, ―b‖ and ―c‖ refer to significance 
at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Weak backwardation for the n-th month futures 
contract 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: 2-month futures 
         
constant 0.071 -0.065 4.534a 2.810a -0.052 -0.198 4.134a 2.456a 
 (0.24) (-0.25) (4.37) (3.89) (-0.17) (-0.72) (3.84) 3.36 
Volatility 0.171c 0.154 0.143 0.176c 0.196b 0.191b 0.133 0.170b 
 (1.68) (1.54) (1.44) (1.76) (2.21) (2.15) (1.49) 1.91 
Quota   -0.018a -0.010a   -0.017a -0.009a 
   (-3.86) (-3.39)   (-3.54) (-3.16) 
Over 0.177a 0.185a   0.168a 0.176a   
 (3.04) (3.20)   (2.88) (3.05)   
Dollar_vol ($/£) 0.157 0.062 0.367 0.420     
 (0.40) (0.16) (0.96) (1.08)     
Dollar_vol ($/¥)     0.454 0.428 0.383 0.501 
     (1.40) (1.32) (1.19) (1.56) 
Spot -0.003  0.010b  -0.003  0.009b  
 (-1.01)  (2.27)  (-1.06)  (2.10)  
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 7.57 7.55 11.60 8.42 9.00 8.91 11.99 9.41 
Panel B: 3-month futures 
         
constant 0.284 -0.006 8.223a 5.364a 0.035 -0.273 7.436a 4.707a 
 (0.57) (-0.01) (4.63) (4.39) (0.07) (-0.58) (4.03) (3.79) 
Volatility 0.386b 0.357b 0.325c 0.376b 0.441a 0.439a 0.314b 0.372b 
 (2.07) (1.92) (1.78) (2.04) (2.76) (2.74) (1.95) (2.32) 
Quota   -0.033a -0.018a   -0.030a -0.016a 
   (-4.00) (-3.75)   (-3.63) (-3.50) 
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Table 3 continued 
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
         
Over 0.325a 0.342a   0.306a 0.324a   
 (3.26) (3.45)   (3.08) (3.28)   
Dollar_vol ($/£) 0.302 0.110 0.655 0.731     
 (0.44) (0.16) (0.97) (1.07)     
Dollar_vol ($/¥)     0.900c 0.858 0.765 0.950c 
     (1.62) (1.54) (1.39) (1.73) 
Spot -0.006  0.016b  -0.006  0.015a  
 (-1.33)  (2.19)  (-1.36)  (1.98)  
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 10.64 10.05 14.29 11.50 12.49 11.84 15.01 12.86 
         
Panel C: 4-month futures 
         
constant 0.548 0.172 11.099a 7.348a 0.187 -0.221 10.078a 6.523a 
 (0.85) (0.29) (4.70) (4.56) (0.28) (-0.36) (4.10) (3.96) 
Volatility 0.557b 0.531b 0.447c 0.505b 0.129a 0.662a 0.465b 0.535b 
 (2.26) (2.15) (1.84) (2.06) (3.09) (3.11) (2.16) (2.50) 
Quota   -0.043a -0.024a   -0.040a -0.022a 
   (-3.96) (-3.76)   (-3.62) (-3.55) 
Over 0.453a 0.477a   0.428a 0.453a   
 (3.43) (3.63)   (3.26) (3.46)   
Dollar_vol ($/£) 0.261 0.031 0.673 0.755     
 (0.29) (0.03) (0.75) (0.83)     
Dollar_vol ($/¥)     1.199c 1.156 1.004 1.239c 
     (1.63) (1.57) (1.37) (1.69) 
Spot -0.008  0.021b  -0.008  0.019b  
 (-1.36)  (2.14)  (-1.41)  (1.93)  
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 12.45 11.81 15.10 12.47 14.37 13.64 16.05 14.07 
         
 
The regression results of monthly weak backwardation for the 2-month, 3-month and 4-
month futures on oil price volatility, OPEC quota, OPEC overproduction, and US Dollar 
exchange rate volatility, are displayed in Table 3. Four different combinations of explanatory 
variables are performed. Since data on the OPEC production is only available after January 1999, 
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the regressions are only estimated for the period of January 1999 to December 2008, which 
results in 120 monthly observations. 
The regressions generally produce qualitatively similar results, implying that the results 
are robust with respect to model specifications. It can be seen, the coefficients of the volatility
19
 
are significantly positive except for two specifications in panel A-Table 3. The significant 
positive association between weak backwardation and volatility is consistent with the prediction 
of Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) theory. The table also reports that the volatility 
coefficients for 4-month contract are the highest in relative to the volatility coefficients for 3-
month and 2-month contracts.  
As predicted, the coefficients of OPEC overproduction are significantly positive, which 
suggests that the greater the level of OPEC overproduction the greater the level of 
backwardation. One explanation for this positive relationship might be that OPEC had to 
intervene heavily by adjusting oil production during the year to keep inventories low, thus 
pushing oil futures into backwardation. 
  I use two exchange rates for the US Dollar: the US Dollar against the British Pound ($/£) 
and the US Dollar against the Japanese Yen. As can be seen from Table 3, none of the 
Dollar_vol ($/£) coefficients are significant in any specification or for any futures contracts. To 
the contrary, Dollar_vol ($/¥) coefficients are positively significant at 10% in two out of four 
specifications for the 3-month and 4-month futures contracts. That is to say, as the volatility of 
the US Dollar against the Japanese Yen increases, the level of weak backwardation increases too. 
Perhaps the difference in results can be explained by the fact that Japan has been among the top 
                                                 
19 In this table the monthly standard deviation of the first difference logarithm of the futures price is used to measure 
oil volatility. The regression is also estimated using unconditional variance using GARCH model. The results are 
reported in Appendix A. In general, this change does not alter the results. 
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three oil import countries, thus the dollar/yen exchange rate reflects better than the dollar/pound 
rate the dollar revenue to oil surplus countries. 
 As a robustness check, the study analyzes the effect of oil volatility, OPEC quota, OPEC 
overproduction, and the volatility of US Dollar exchange rate on the extent of strong 
backwardation. The regression results are reported in Table 4. As can be seen, the results do not 
change qualitatively except for the oil volatility and the spot variables. More specifically, the 
coefficients of OPEC qutoa, OPEC overproduction, volatility of US Dollar exchange rate against 
the British Pound, and the volatility of US Dollar exchange rate against the Japanese Yen did not 
show any major changes from those in Table 3. As for the volatility and spot variables, the table 
shows that the volatility coefficients is not significant for the 2-month contract in any 
specifications; however it is significant in 3 out of 8 specifications for the 3-month and 4-month 
contracts (which is not the case for the weak backwardation regression). As for the spot variable, 
the table shows that the coefficient is positively significant in most specifications; this is 
consistent with a binding production capacity constraint that suggests a positive association 
between the spot price of oil and backwardation.  
 The adjusted R2 from the weak and strong backwardation regressions are not impressive; 
thus it is possible that other factors might affect oil backwardation. Factors such as political risk 
and transport and storage capacity are potential candidates but are hard to quantify. One possible 
factor that is measurable is the oil funds activities. It can be argued that these funds create 
demand for futures causing the price of futures to rise relative to the oil spot price. To test for 
that, the study includes trading volume of the United States Oil Fund (USO) in the regression 
analysis. USO is an Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) traded on NYMEX that invests in near-month 
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of oil futures contracts. It was launched on April 10, 2006 as the first oil ETF that allows U.S. 
investors to put money directly on the price of crude oil. 
 
Table 4: Regression Analysis of Strong Backwardation 
The table reports the regression results using monthly data of strong backwardation for the 2-
month, 3-month, and 4-month futures contract, using the White (1980) correction, on oil 
volatility, OPEC quota and overproduction, volatility of US Dollar exchange rate, and the spot 
price, during January 1999 – December 2008. Strong backwardation is measured as the 
difference between the price of the 1-month futures contract (proxy of spot price) and futures 
price of the n-th month futures contract. Volatility is the realized volatility of crude oil futures, 
measured as the standard deviation of the first difference logarithm of the n-th month futures 
price. Quota is the OPEC crude oil production ceiling measured in 1,000 barrel/day. Over is the 
OPEC overproduction rate defined as the actual production rate minus OPEC quota measured in 
1,000 barrel/day. Dollar_vol ($/£) is the volatility of the US Dollar exchange rate against the 
British Pound. Dollar_vol ($/¥) is the volatility of the US Dollar exchange rate against the 
Japanese Yen. Spot is the price of the 1-month futures contract, used as a proxy for the spot 
price. The t-values are given in parentheses. The notations ―a‖, ―b‖ and ―c‖ refer to significance 
at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: Strong backwardation for the n-th month futures 
contract 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: 2-month futures 
         
constant -0.162 -0.515 4.833a 3.545a -0.315 -0.682 4.283a 3.095a 
 (-0.52) (-1.82) (4.50) (4.79) (-0.98) (-2.33) (3.84)   (4.13) 
Volatility 0.134 0.090 0.103 0.128 0.150 0.135 0.079 0.105 
 (1.26) (0.84) (1.00) (1.25) (1.61) (1.43) (0.86) (1.16) 
Quota   -0.021a -0.014a   -0.019a -0.013a 
   (-4.22) (-4.90)   (-3.78) (-4.60) 
Over 0.183a 0.204a   0.172a 0.192a   
 
(3.00) 
  
(3.29)   (2.82) (3.11)   
Dollar_vol ($/£) 0.335 0.089 0.566 0.605     
 (0.82) (0.22) (1.43) (1.52)     
Dollar_vol ($/¥)     0.609c 0.543 0.519 0.603c 
     (1.80) (1.57) (1.56)   (1.83) 
Spot 0.007b  0.007c  0.007b  0.007  
 (2.51)  (1.64)  (2.54)  (1.43)  
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 10.64 6.54 16.57 15.35 12.58 8.46 16.86 16.11 
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Table 4 continued 
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel B: 3-month futures 
         
constant -0.068 -0.674 8.714a 6.512a -0.362 -0.995b 7.717a 5.727a 
 (-0.13) (-1.4) (4.71) (5.17) (-0.67) (-1.99) (4.02) (4.47) 
Volatility 0.322c 0.261 0.255 0.294 0.362b 0.358b 0.223 0.265 
 (1.64) (1.31) (1.34) (1.54)  (2.16) (2.08) (1.33) (1.60) 
Quota   -0.036a -0.025a   -0.033a -0.023a 
   (-4.28) (-5.06 )    (-3.84) (-4.76) 
Over 0.335a 0.3720   0.314a 0.350a   
 (3.19) (3.49)   (3.01)   (3.30)   
Dollar_vol ($/£) 0.551 0.149 0.933 0.992     
 (0.76) (0.21) (1.33) (1.41)     
Dollar_vol ($/¥)     1.125b 1.038c 0.959c 1.094b 
     (1.93) (1.74) (1.67) (1.93) 
Spot 0.012a  0.012c  0.012a  0.011  
 (2.64)  (1.62)  (2.68)  (1.39)  
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 12.86 8.37 18.19 17.05 15.17 10.66 18.9 18.25 
         
Panel C: 4-month futures 
         
constant 0.086 -0.703 11.804a 8.934a -0.331 -1.171c 10.516a 7.952a 
 (0.13) (-1.11) (4.76) (5.33) (-0.47) (-1.78) (4.09) (4.64) 
Volatility 0.466 0.412 0.345 0.390 0.545b 0.561b 0.337 0.387c 
 (1.78) (1.54) (1.36) (1.53) (2.44)   (2.44) (1.50) (1.74) 
Quota   -0.048a -0.034a   -0.044a -0.031a 
   (-4.24) (-5.08)   (-3.83) (-4.82) 
Over 0.467a 0.517a   0.438a 0.488a   
 (3.34) (3.63)   (3.15) (3.45)   
Dollar_vol ($/£) 0.583 0.100 1.033 1.096     
 (0.61) (0.10) (1.10) (1.16)     
Dollar_vol ($/¥)     1.498b 1.409c 1.258c 1.427c 
     (1.93) (1.77) (1.63) (1.87) 
Spot 0.017a  0.016  0.016a  0.014  
 (2.69)  (1.56)  (2.73)  (1.33)  
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 14.24 9.64 18.68 17.66 16.66 12.01 19.68 19.15 
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Table 5: Role of Oil Fund on Backwardation--Regression Analysis 
The table reports the regression results using monthly data of weak and strong backwardation for 
the 2-month, 3-month, and 4-month futures contract, using the White (1980) correction, on oil 
volatility, OPEC quota and overproduction, volatility of US Dollar exchange rate, and the spot 
price, during April 2006 – December 2008. Weak backwardation is measured as the difference 
between the price of the 1-month futures contract (proxy of spot price) and discounted futures 
price of the n-th month futures contract. Strong backwardation is measured as the difference 
between the price of the 1-month futures contract and futures price of the n-th month futures 
contract. Volatility is the realized volatility of crude oil futures, measured as the standard 
deviation of the first difference logarithm of the n-th month futures price. Quota is the OPEC 
crude oil production ceiling measured in 1,000 barrel/day. Over is the OPEC overproduction rate 
defined as the actual production rate minus OPEC quota measured in 1,000 barrel/day. 
Dollar_vol ($/£) is the volatility of the US Dollar exchange rate against the British Pound. 
Dollar_vol ($/¥) is the volatility of the US Dollar exchange rate against the Japanese Yen. Spot is 
the price of the 1-month futures contract, used as a proxy for the spot price. Fund_volume is the 
natural logarithm of the United States oil fund trading volume. The t-values are given in 
parentheses. The notations ―a‖, ―b‖ and ―c‖ refer to significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 Dependent variable: 
Weak backwardation 
Dependent variable: 
Strong backwardation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: 2-month futures     
         
constant -4.171a 5.932c -3.965a 5.927c -4.924a 4.724 -4.694a 4.571 
 (-6.11) (1.70) (-6.01) (1.89) (-7.01) (1.30) (-7.01) (1.43) 
Volatility -0.291 -0.361 -0.211 -0.285 -0.325 -0.393 -0.271) -0.338 
 (-1.08) (-1.26) (-1.05) (-1.35) (-1.17) (-1.32) (-1.33) (-1.56) 
Quota  -0.038b  -0.038a  -0.036b  -0.035b 
  (-2.66)  (-2.89)  (-2.43)  (-2.63) 
Over 0.334a  0.310a  0.333a  0.302a  
 (3.39)  (3.30)  (3.29)  (3.17)  
Dollar_vol ($/£) 0.375 0.599   0.595 0.797   
 (0.60) (0.88)   (0.92) 1.13)   
Dollar_vol ($/¥)   0.769c 1.026b   0.942b 1.189b 
   (1.77)   (2.30)    (2.14) (2.60) 
Spot 0.038a 0.054a 0.034a 0.049a 0.039a 0.054a 0.035a 0.048a 
 (6.41) (6.16) (5.61)  ( 5.79) (6.38) (5.95) (5.59) (5.57) 
Fund _volume -0.015a -0.015a -0.014a -0.013a -0.014a -0.014a -0.013a -0.013a 
 (-3.87) (-3.60) (-3.79) (-3.58) (-3.57) (-3.28) (-3.52) (-3.29) 
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 64.67 60.1 67.94 65.66 62.45 56.86 66.9 63.86 
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Table 5 continued      
     
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel B: 3-month futures     
         
constant -7.227a 11.050c -6.835a 11.227b -8.378a 9.325 -7.942a 9.292c 
 (-6.49) (1.84) (-6.42) (2.11) (-7.29) (1.50) (-7.34) (1.71) 
Volatility -0.485 -0.608 -0.267 -0.398 -0.538 -0.660 -0.360 -0.480 
 (-1.04) (-1.21) (-0.79) (-1.11) (-1.12) (-1.27) (-1.05) (-1.30) 
Quota  -0.069b  -0.068a  -0.067b  -0.065a 
  (-2.78)  (-3.10)  (-2.58)  (-2.88) 
Over 0.611a  0.568a  0.614a  0.560a  
 (3.65)  (3.60)  (3.55)  (3.49)  
Dollar_vol ($/£) 0.511 0.911   0.840 1.211   
 (0.47) (0.76)   (0.75) (0.97)   
Dollar_vol ($/¥)   1.439c 1.910b   1.701b 2.159b 
   (1.96) (2.50)   (2.28)   2.76) 
Spot 0.066a 0.094a 0.058a 0.084a 0.067a 0.094a 0.059a 0.083a 
 (6.74)   (6.32) (5.86) (6.02) (6.68) (6.12) (5.83) (5.81) 
Fund _volume -0.025a -0.025a -0.022a -0.022a -0.024a -0.023a -0.021a -0.021a 
 (-3.93) (-3.58) (-3.78) (-3.52) (-3.64) (-3.28) (-3.54) (-3.25) 
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 66.44 61.05 70.37 67.69 64.19 57.83 69.34 65.94 
              
Panel C: 4-month futures     
         
constant 
-9.357a 15.344c -8.851a 15.618b 
-
10.915a 13.140 -10.341a 13.141c 
 (-6.49) (1.91) (-6.43) (2.20) (-7.31) (1.57) (-7.38) (1.80) 
Volatility -0.563 -0.725 -0.233 -0.406 -0.636 -0.797 -0.359 -0.518 
 (-0.90) (-1.07) (-0.52) (-0.84) (-0.99) (-1.13) (-0.78) (-1.04) 
Quota  -0.093a  -0.093a  -0.090b  -0.088a 
  (-2.80)  (-3.14)  (-2.60)  (-2.92) 
Over 0.833a  0.775a  0.841a  0.768a  
 (3.74)  (3.70)  (3.65)  (3.60)  
Dollar_vol ($/£) 0.597 1.138   1.037 1.543   
 (0.41) (0.71)   (0.69) (0.92)   
Dollar_vol ($/¥)   1.947c 2.589b   2.299b 2.928b 
   (1.99) (2.53)   (2.31) (2.78) 
Spot 0.086a 0.124a 0.077a 0.111a 0.089a 0.125a 0.077a 0.111a 
 6.86) (6.32) (5.96) (6.05) (6.79) (6.11) (5.91) (5.84) 
Fund _volume -0.032a -0.032a -0.029a -0.028a -0.031a -0.030a -0.027a -0.026a 
 (-3.89) (-3.50) (-3.71) (-3.41) (-3.59) (-3.20) (-3.45) (-3.13) 
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 67.28 61.47 71.29 68.29 64.72 57.88 70.01 66.25 
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The regression analysis of weak and strong backwardation is repeated with the addition 
of the monthly logarithm trading volume of USO. The regression is estimated using monthly 
data between April 2006 and December 2008, which results in 33 monthly observations. The 
results are reported in Table 5. As shown from the table, the USO volume coefficients are highly 
significantly negative in all specifications. That is to say, the investment activities of USO fund 
play an important role in driving up the futures prices in relative to the spot price (i.e., lowering 
the level of backwardation). The regression results are also supported by Figure 5 which shows 
the negative association between fund activities and the level of backwardation over time.  
Moreover, it should be noted that the adjusted R2 improved substantially, when taking into 
account the fund activities variable, compared with the value of adjusted R2 in Tables 3 and 4. 
Nevertheless, the sample period is much shorter and the number of observations is smaller than 
the earlier analysis, so caution must be taken in generalizing this sub-period analysis. 
As for the other variables in the regression, the coefficients of OPEC qutoa and OPEC 
overproduction variables stay significant; the oil spot coefficients are positively significant that 
supports a binding production capacity constraint, and the coefficients of the volatility of the US 
Dollar exchange rate against the Japanese Yen are positively significant as in Table 3 and 4. 
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Figure 5: Crude Oil Weak Backwardation and the United States Oil Fund (USO) Trading 
Volume 
 (April 2006 – December 2008) 
 
The figures 5-A and 5-B show the daily strong and weak backwardation of the 4-month futures 
contract respectively vs. the daily trading volume for the United States Oil Fund (symbol: USO). 
Strong backwardation is measured as the difference between the price of the 1-month futures 
contract (proxy of spot price) and futures price of the n-th month futures contract. Weak 
Backwardation is measured as the difference between the price of the 1-month futures contract 
and discounted futures price of the 4-month futures contract. 
 
 
(A) USO trading volume and strong backwardation of the 4-month WTI futures contract. 
 
 
(B) USO trading volume and weak backwardation of the 4-month WTI futures contract. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
This study shows that oil futures generally exhibit backwardation. Specificly, it shows 
that oil futures are strongly and weakly backwardated 57% and 69% of the time, respectively, 
during the period from January 1986 to December 2008. The study also finds that the level of 
backwardation is higher for the far-month-futures contracts than that of the nearby futures 
contracts.  
This study further examines the influence of oil price volatility, the behavior of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the volatility of US Dollar 
exchange rate on the extent of weak and strong backwardation of crude oil futures during 
January 1986 – December 2008.  The study builds on Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) 
theory that offer an explanation for the backwardation in oil futures based on the option pricing 
theory.  
Both Dollar value and OPEC behavior are believed to be important factors affecting oil 
price. The regression results show that OPEC behavior significantly affect the relation between 
spot and futures prices of oil. More specifically, the study finds that OPEC production quota 
imposed on its members has a negative significant effect on weak and strong backwardation, 
while the OPEC member’s overproduction (difference between quota and the actual production) 
has a positive significant effect on oil backwardation. Put differently, the increased uncertainty 
about the future supply of OPEC members due to the deviation from the allocated production 
ceiling results in a greater backwardation level. 
On the other hand, the uncertainty of US Dollar exchange rate is believed to discourage 
current oil production; hence greater backwardations will be needed to encourage current 
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production. The weak and strong backwardation regression results show that the coefficients of 
the volatility of US Dollar exchange rate against the Japanese Yen are positively significant. 
However the volatility of US Dollar exchange rate against the British Pound has no significant 
effect on oil backwardation. This difference in results could be explained by the fact that Japan 
has been among the top three oil import countries, thus the dollar/yen exchange rate reflects 
better than the dollar/pound rate the dollar revenue to oil surplus countries. 
The regression analysis shows positive association between weak backwardation and 
volatility in most specifications. This result confirms the prior work by Litzenberger and 
Rabinowitz (1995).  However, volatility is not significant in the strong backwardation regression. 
The study also investigates the role of oil funds on the backwardation. To this regard, the 
study includes the volume of the United States Oil fund (USO) in the regression analysis. The 
results indicate a negative association between USO volume and backwardation. This result 
makes sense since oil funds create demand on oil futures causing futures price to go up, thus 
lower level of backwardation. 
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Appendix A 
Regression Analysis of Weak Backwardation 
 
The table reports the regression results using monthly data of weak backwardation for the 2-
month, 3-month, and 4-month futures contract, using the White (1980) correction, on oil 
volatility, OPEC quota and overproduction, volatility of US Dollar exchange rate, and the spot 
price, during January 1999 – December 2008. Weak backwardation is measured as the difference 
between the price of the 1-month futures contract (proxy of spot price) and discounted futures 
price of the n-th month futures contract. Volatility is the unconditional variance of the n-th month 
oil futures using GARCH model. Quota is the OPEC crude oil production ceiling measured in 
1,000 barrel/day. Over is the OPEC overproduction rate defined as the actual production rate 
minus OPEC quota measured in 1,000 barrel/day. Dollar_vol ($/£) is the volatility of the US 
Dollar exchange rate against the British Pound. Dollar_vol ($/¥) is the volatility of the US Dollar 
exchange rate against the Japanese Yen. Spot is the price of the 1-month futures contract, used as 
a proxy for the spot price. The t-values are given in parentheses. The notations ―a‖, ―b‖ and ―c‖ 
refer to significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: Weak backwardation for the n-th month futures contract 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: 2-month futures 
         
constant -0.196 -0.299 4.115a 2.381a -0.335 -0.451c 3.747a 2.057b 
 (-0.73) (-1.22) (3.93) (3.41) (-1.19) (-1.81) (3.40) (2.81) 
Volatility 2.953b 2.879b 2.300c 2.726b 0.031a 0.031a 0.021c 0.026 
 (2.41) (2.35) (1.88) (2.23) (2.77) (2.79) (1.89) (2.31) 
Quota   -0.017a -0.009a   -1.600a -0.800a 
   (-3.66) (-3.18)   (-3.33) (-2.91) 
Over 0.176a 0.183a   0.167a 0.174a   
 (3.05) (3.21)   (2.90) (3.04)   
Dollar_vol ($/£) 0.214 0.152 0.380 0.420     
 (0.59) (0.43) (1.06) (1.16)     
Dollar_vol ($/¥)     0.435 0.421 0.380 0.482 
     (1.41) (1.37) (1.24) (1.57) 
Spot -0.002  0.010b  -0.002  0.009b  
 (-0.91)  (2.20)  (-0.89)  (2.03)  
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 9.84 9.96 12.71 9.82 11.10 11.25 13.01 10.67 
         
         
Panel B: 3-month futures 
         
constant -0.316 -0.487 7.974a 4.512a -0.627 -0.807c 7.266a 3.958a 
 
(-0.66) (-1.14) (4.52) (3.70) (-1.28) (-1.88) (3.95) (3.09) 
Volatility 4.523b 4.766b 4.740b 4.164c 0.051a 0.054a 0.043b 0.041b 
 (2.04) (2.17) (2.20) (1.89) (2.62) (2.84) (2.24) (2.12) 
Quota   -0.034a -0.017a   -3.100a -1.500a 
   (-4.21) (-3.43)   (-3.90) (-3.19) 
Over 0.322a 0.332a   0.305a 0.315a   
 (3.22) (3.37)   (3.06) (3.19)   
86 
 
Appendix A continued 
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Dollar_vol ($/£) 0.179 0.143 0.719 0.579     
 (0.27) (0.22) (1.12) (0.88)     
         
Dollar_vol ($/¥)     0.742 0.748 0.703 0.814 
     (1.38) (1.39) (1.34) (1.52) 
Spot -0.004  0.019a  -0.003  0.018b  
 (-0.80)  (2.66)  (-0.77)  (2.46)  
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 10.53 10.8 15.49 11.07 11.92 12.23 15.87 12.22 
         
Panel C: 4-month futures 
         
constant 0.117 -0.206 11.170a 6.965a -0.426 -0.888 10.883a 6.634a 
 (0.19) (-0.36) (4.62) (4.24) (-0.64) (-1.50) (4.34) (3.88) 
Volatility 0.044 -0.034 -0.080 0.074 0.001 0.000+ -0.001 0.001 
 (0.20) (-0.16) (-0.37) (0.36) (0.30) (0.14) (-0.33) (0.39) 
Quota   -0.045a -0.024a   -4.600a -2.500a 
   (-4.07) (-3.66)   (-4.12) (-3.86) 
Over .440a 0.462a   0.417a 0.443a   
 (3.26) (3.45)   (3.05) (3.25)   
Dollar_vol ($/£) -0.975 -1.137 -0.326 -0.356     
 (-1.32) (-1.57) (-0.45) (-0.48)     
Dollar_vol ($/¥)     0.283 0.218 0.300 0.473 
     (0.40) (0.31) (0.45) (0.69) 
Spot -0.007  0.024b  -0.009  0.024b  
 (-1.17)  (2.33)  (-1.45)  (2.28)  
         
Adjusted R2 (%) 8.59 8.31 12.72 9.37 7.33 6.44 12.71 9.56 
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Appendix B 
Correlation Matrix 
 
Volatility is the unconditional variance of the n-th month oil futures using GARCH model. Quota 
is the OPEC crude oil production ceiling measured in 1,000 barrel/day. Over is the OPEC 
overproduction rate defined as the actual production rate minus OPEC quota measured in 1,000 
barrel/day. Dollar_vol ($/£) is the volatility of the US Dollar exchange rate against the British 
Pound. Dollar_vol ($/¥) is the volatility of the US Dollar exchange rate against the Japanese 
Yen. Spot is the price of the 1-month futures contract, used as a proxy for the spot price. 
Fund_volume is the natural logarithm of the United States oil fund trading volume. 
 
 Volatility 
2-month 
Volatility 
3-month 
Volatility 
4-month 
Quota Over Dollar_vol 
($/£) 
Dollar_vol 
($/¥) 
Fund 
_volume 
January 1999 – December 2008 
 
        Volatility 2-
month 1.000               
Volatility 3-
month 0.994 1.000             
Volatility 4-
month 0.955 0.966 1.000           
Quota -0.048 -0.093 -0.121 1.000         
Over -0.067 -0.064 -0.079 -0.479 1.000       
Dollar_vol 
($/£) -0.570 -0.605 -0.609 0.227 0.063 1.000     
Dollar_vol 
($/¥) -0.397 -0.410 -0.414 -0.025 0.139 0.485 1.000   
                  
April 2006 – December 2008 
 
        Volatility 2-
month 1.000               
Volatility 3-
month 0.999 1.000             
Volatility 4-
month 0.998 1.000 1.000           
Quota -0.177 -0.201 -0.217 1.000         
Over 
-0.109 -0.103 -0.099 -0.515 1.000       
Dollar_vol 
($/£) -0.855 -0.862 -0.865 0.252 0.027 1.000     
Dollar_vol 
($/¥) -0.593 -0.607 -0.616 0.361 0.126 0.823 1.000   
Fund 
_volume -0.788 -0.791 -0.793 0.394 0.137 0.594 0.463 1.000 
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